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Some scholars in China argue that minority rights inscribed in 
law, such as ethnic regional autonomy and preferential policies, 
must be reformed along liberal lines: minorities should be 
“depoliticized” -- treated as cultural groups whose members have 
only individual, not colleve, rights.  They propose a “second 
generation of ethnic policies” for China that they argue would 
resemble policies in the United States and India.  This article 
shows, however, that the United States and India do not have the 
features of ethnic equity and peace that they are supposed to 
exemplify, as their minorities have subordinate, deteriorating 
social positions and are generally disaffected.  The choice for 
China’s minorities need not be a binary of individual rights only 
or no change in the present system.  An expansion, rather than 
contraction, of minority rights may instead create greater ethnic 
equality and stability in China. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
The United States is often proclaimed the “world’s greatest 
democracy,” although social scientists have concluded otherwise.1  
India styles itself “the world’s largest democracy,” a sobriquet that 
some Indians themselves challenge.2  In any case, the policy sets 
that the two countries embody in their laws, regulations, and 
practices expectedly attract attention from liberal-minded Chinese, 
who assume that U.S. and Indian government policies are better 
than their counterpart in the world’s largest one-party state, China.  
Such an assumption has certainly characterized the important 
ongoing discourse about China’s ethnic policies in recent years.   
In a decade-long debate in China on whether to sharply 
change the country’s system of ethnic laws and policies, prominent 
scholars, such as Peking University sociologist Ma Rong – himself a 
member of the Hui or Muslim Chinese ethnic minority – and 
Tsinghua University economist Hu Angang, have sought a liberalist 
“depoliticization” of minorities.  They want ethnicity-related law 
and practice to be pared, in order to de-emphasize collective rights 
for members of China’s minority groups, subordinate ethnic identity 
to national identity, and secure China’s territorial integrity.  Their 
argument is that diminished ethnic identity among minorities will 
lessen hostility toward the Han majority, although studies elsewhere 
have shown that high levels of ethnic identity and even political 
activism among minorities in fact tend to increase their positivity 
toward their countries’ ethnic majorities.3 
                                                
1  The Democratic Barometer, using 100 empirical indicators to measure democratic 
principles and functions of 30 “consolidated democracies” in 1995-2005, found that 
Denmark (score: 88.3) ranked number one; the US (score: 74.9), ranked number ten. 
University of Zurich, DENMARK, FINLAND, AND BELGIUM HAVE BEST DEMOCRACIES (2011), 
http://www.mediadesk.uzh.ch/articles/2011/schweizerdemokratie/110115_MM_Demokrati
ebarometer_Europa_E_def.pdf.  The Economist Intelligence Unit’s “Democracy Index 
2012,” which applied five procedural and substantive criteria to 165 countries, ranked 
Norway number one and the US number 21, 
https://portoncv.gov.cv/dhub/porton.por_global.open_file?p_doc_id=1034.  See generally 
Daniel A. Bell, BEYOND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL THINKING FOR AN EAST ASIAN 
CONTEXT (2009) (discusses disjunctions between liberal democracy and ethnic rights.)  
2 Sukhman Dhami, India Won’t Be ‘The World’s Largest Democracy’ Until It Upholds 
Human Rights, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, (Mar. 29, 2013), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2013/0329/India-won-t-be-the-world-s-
largest democracy-until-it-upholds-human-rights. 
3 Fiona Kate Barlow et al., Rejection as a Call to Arms: Inter-racial Hostility and Dupport 
for Political Action as Outcomes of Race-based Rejection in Majority and Minority Groups, 
51 BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 167-77 (2012); Sylvia Chen, et al., Do 
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Proponents of depoliticization hold that a “second generation” 
of ethnic policies (di er dai minzu zhengce) would move away from 
the official division of Chinese into 56 ethnic groups,4 the existing 
low-level, legally-mandated ethnic regional autonomy (minzu quyu 
zizhi) that aims for a modicum of ethnic minority leadership and 
cultural preservation in minority areas,5 and preferential policies 
(youhui zhengce) for minorities in such areas as university 
admissions, family planning, hiring officials, and business loans.6 
That change would render minorities strictly cultural entities, who 
retain only whatever individual rights are provided Chinese citizens. 
Scholars who favor depoliticization bolster their arguments 
by citing India and the United States as successful models of 
systems that supposedly do without the range of laws, regulations 
and official practices related to ethnic relations that are found in 
China. 7   Hu Angang, for example, contends that rising ethnic 
consciousness threatens social stability.  China, he claims, should 
dissipate ethnic identity, strengthen national identity, and 
depoliticize ethnic issues through institutional arrangements that do 
not to allow anyone to claim to be representatives of local and 
                                                                                                           
Whites Direct their Prejudice toward Strongly Identified Asians? 5 MIND MATTERS: THE 
WESLEYAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, 39-50 (2010) (discussing how stronger ethnic 
identity among minorities may also correlate with more positive majority attitudes toward 
minorities).  See also Christopher Wolsko et al., Framing Interethnic Ideology: Effects of 
Multicultural and Color-blind Perspectives on Judgments of Groups and Individuals, 78 
JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, No. 4, 635-54 (2000)(explicating 
how increased differentiation of ethnic out-groups from ethnic in-groups actually increases 
positivity toward the out-group.) 
4 See generally Emily C. Hannum & Meiyan Wang, Ethnicity, Socioeconomic Status, and 
Social Welfare in China, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, POVERTY AND DEVELOPMENT (Gillette 
Hall & Harry Patrinos ed., 2010). 
5 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minzu Quyu Zizhifa (中国人民共和国民族区域自
治法) [Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated 
by National People's Congress, May 31, 1984, effective Oct. 1, 1984). See Haiting Zhang, 
The Laws on the Ethnic Minority Autonomous Regions in China: Legal Norms and 
Practices, 9 THE. LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV 249, 249-64 (2011)(discusses the law’s 
deficiencies); Xia Chunli, From Discourse Politics to Rule of Law: A Constructivist 
Framework for Understanding Regional Ethnic Autonomy in China, 14 INTERNATIONAL 
JOURNAL ON MINORITY AND GROUP RIGHTS, 399-424 (2007). 
6 See, e.g., Wang Tiezhi, Preferential Policies for Ethnic Minority Students in China’s 
College/University Admission, 8 ASIAN ETHNICITY 149, 149-63 (2007); Gu Baochang et al., 
China’s Local and National Fertility Policies at the End of the Twentieth Century, 33 
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 129, 129-47 (2007). 
7  See Ma Rong, Lijie Minzu Guanxi De Xinsilu Shaoshu Zuqun De Quzhengzhihua, 41 
BEIJING DAXUE XUEBAO 122 (北京大学学报 ), 122-33 (2004). See generally Barry 
Sautman, Paved with Good Intentions: Proposals to Curb Minority Rights and Their 
Consequences for China, 38 MODERN CHINA 10, 10-39 (2011). 
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ethnic interests.  He asserts that the United States government does 
not recognize racial/ethnic corporatism or allow any ethnic group its 
own autonomous territory.  United States citizens’ identity thus has 
no ethnic content.  Because the United States emphasizes individual, 
not group, rights and avoids linking gaps in citizens’ wealth, power, 
employment and education to ethnic status, unity is assured and 
individual conflicts do not evolve into ethnic conflicts.  In China, 
however, autonomous areas, together with their resources, are seen 
as ethnic groups’ own property.  Ethnic leaders view themselves as 
the highest proponents of their group’s interests, vying to be its 
spokespeople within a federal framework.  Angang views this as 
flawed, believing that no privileges, rights or duties should accrue 
from ethnicity, all jurisdictions should be equal before the law, and 
depoliticization should be used to promote ethnic amalgamation.8 
Leading critics of depoliticization among China’s scholars, 
such as ethnic Mongolian anthropologist and Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences (CASS) Deputy Secretary General Hao Shiyuan and 
his CASS colleague Chen Jianyue, argue that while existing policies 
give most minorities a solidly Chinese identity, the United States 
and India are replete with ethnic problems and cannot be successful 
models.9  China’s government, of course, also defends its policies10 
                                                
8 Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe, Dierdai Minzu Zhengce: Cuijin Minzu Jiaorong Yiti He 
Fanrong (第二代民族政策:促民族交融一体和繁荣一体)[the Second Generation Ethnic 
Policy: Promoting Amalgamation and Prosperousness of Ethnicity], 32 XINJIANG SHIFAN 
DAXUE XUEBAO (新疆范大学学报 ) [JOURNAL OF XINJIANG NORMAL UNIVERSITY] 
(2011). Ma Rong discusses India and the U.S.; Hu and Hu also discuss Brazil. Hao 
Shiyuan, Baxi Yindu Nengwei Zhongguo Minzu Shiwu Tigong Shime Jingyan Pingxi 
Dierdai Minzu Zhengceshuo Zhisi [What ‘Experience’ Can Brazil and India Provide for 
China in Dealing With Ethnic Issues?], RENWEI YU SHEHUI (人文与社会), (Aug. 22, 
2012), http://wen.org.cn/modules/article/view.article.php/3465. See Tom Phillips, Brazil 
Census Shows African-Brazilians in the Majority for the First Time, THE GUARDIAN, 
(Nov. 17, 2011), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/17/brazil-
census-african-brazilians-majority/  (The 2010 census indicated 51% of Brazilians are 
“mixed race” or black.  White people, on average, earn 2.4 times what black people earn.).  
Discrimination causes a substantial portion of Brazilian “racial” inequality.  Stanley Bailey 
et al., Measures of Race and the Analysis of Racial Inequality in Brazil, 42 SOCIAL 
SCIENCE RESEARCH 106 (2013). 
9 Hao Shiyuan, Guoji Jingyan de Bijiao he Jiejian Bixu Shishi Qiushi: Ping Dierdai Minzu 
Zhengce Shuo Zhisan (Shang) [Realistically seek truth in comparing and learning from 
international experience: third comment on the second generation of ethnic policies (part 
1)], ZHONGGUO MINZU ZONGJIAO WANG (Mar. 2, 2012), 
http://www.mzb.com.cn/html/Home/report/293035-1.htm; see also Chen Jianyue, 
Duominzu guojia he xieshehui de goujian yu minzu wenti de jueding [Construction of 
Harmonious Society and solution of ethnicity complexity in Multi-Ethnic Country: 
Commentary on Depoliticization And Deculturalization of Ethnic Problems], Shijie Minzu 
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and attributes unrest to uneven development and, in Tibet, to 
intervention by exiles and their foreign supporters.  China’s 
government additionally cites links between Uygur separatists and 
external jihadist forces as the source of unrest in the northwestern 
Uygur minority region of Xinjiang.  Officials hold that problems 
can be overcome by raising minority living standards.11  One official, 
however, United Front Work Department (tongzhan bu) vice 
director for the Tibet issue Zhu Weiqun, has floated proposals 
loosely tied to depoliticization.  He seeks to remove ethnic 
indicators from identity cards, prevent the creation of more 
autonomous areas, and promote mixed-ethnicity schools and 
national education.12  
Proposed liberalist changes in ethnic policies were criticized 
at a 2012 gathering at CASS.  Scholars saw them as rash, dangerous, 
and naïve efforts to erase ethnic minorities as subjects bearing 
political rights and quickly amalgamate (ronghe) ethnic groups.  
They denounced efforts to implement a failed U.S. model of 
assimilation – while ignoring China’s own experience – as 
simplistic, and argued for the protection of minority rights by 
expanding cultural justice (wenhua zhengyi). 13   Scholars who 
conducted survey research on ethnic and national identity in China 
                                                                                                           
(世界民族)[Worldwide Ethnicity] (2005).  Many of Hao Shiyuan’s essays are collected at 
Minzubao.com, http://www.mzb.com.cn/html/Home/folder/292573-1.htm.  
10 Info. Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic Of China, China’s Ethnic 
Policy and Common Prosperity and Development of All Ethnic Groups, CHINESE 
GOVERNMENT’S OFFICIAL WEB PORTAL, (Sep. 27, 2009), 
http://english.gov.cn/official/2009-09/27/content_1427989.htm. 
11  Bhavna Singh, Ethnicity, Separatism and Terrorism in Xinjiang: China’s Triple 
Conundrum, INSTITUTE OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, (Aug, 2010), 
http://www.ipcs.org/special-report/china/ethnicity-separatism-and-terrorism-in-xinjiang-
chinas-triple-conundrum-96.html. See also Xiao Jie, India Still Maintaining Double 
Standard Toward Exile Tibetans, GLOBAL TIMES, (Aug. 5, 2012), 
http://www.tibetsun.com/elsewhere/2012/08/05/india-still-maintaining-double-standard-
toward-exiled-tibetans. 
12 Chang Xuemei (常雪梅), Dui Dangqian Minzu Lingyu Wendi De Jidian Sikao [a Few 
Thoughts on Current Problems in the Field of Ethnicity], XUEXI SHIBAO, (Feb. 15, 2012), 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64102/17122242.html.  See also JAMES LEIBOLD, 
ETHNIC POLICY IN CHINA: IS REFORM INEVITABLE? 41-43 (2013) Most sociological 
studies of ethnicity and education in China see schools as already emphasizing “national 
unity and patriotism.” Some scholars decry “assimilative schooling” and “favor what they 
call a multicultural approach.”  Hua-Yu Sebastian Cherng et al., Sociological Perspectives 
on Ethnicity and Education in China: Views from Chinese and English Literatures (Apr. 
17, 2013), UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, http://repository.upenn.edu/elmm/4.  
13 Liu Ling(刘玲), Jianchi Jiben Zhengzhi Zhidu Zai Fazhanzhon Gjiejue Minzu Wenti 
[Insist on Fundamental Framework Resolve Ethnic Problems], (Feb. 23, 2012), 
http://iea.cass.cn/content-BA0810-2012031609383390681.htm. 
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have also concluded that “[i]f the state fails to continue to promote 
ethnic identity and guarantee affirmative action and some degree of 
autonomy, then being Chinese could lose its attraction and the 
fragile balance between the state and the minorities would 
collapse.”14  Debate continues in China and, unusual for such a 
political matter, has appeared in publications targeting foreigners.15   
The putative success of U.S. and Indian policies is key to 
arguments for depoliticization. Ma Rong argues China should learn 
from U.S. cultural integration policies, which have made minorities 
into “sub-cultural” groups that view the United States as their nation.  
These groups communicate well with each other, as shown by 
substantial intermarriage and other mutual assimilations.  Rong also 
contends that the U.S. government neither sees disadvantage among 
minorities as a political issue nor acts to separately protect them; 
instead, the state and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
provide welfare.  The state encourages recognition of ethnic cultural 
differences (cultural pluralism), but treats all groups as politically 
equal.  Despite insistence on assimilation and the primacy of 
English and Christianity, a consensus allows ethnic groups to 
preserve their cultures and avoid discrimination.  Ethnicity is not 
specified on U.S. identity cards and is not required on job 
applications or for the census.  The government seeks reduced 
residential and school segregation.  Political homogeneity coexists 
with cultural diversity and ethnic issues are treated only as 
individual or social matters.  The United States thus has great 
national cohesiveness and identity, with separatist tendencies found 
only among the most disadvantaged minorities.16  India, for Ma 
Rong, also has a culturalist, depoliticized approach to ethnicity.  The 
state promotes Indian nationalism and 90% of citizens are proud to 
                                                
14 Wenfang Tang and Gaochao He, Seperate but Loyal: Ethnicity and Nationalism in 
China 29-35, 38-39, 43-44 (2010) 
15 See, e.g., Wang Wenwen, Han in Xinjiang Victims of Favorable Minority Policies, 
GLOBAL TIMES, (Mar. 18, 2012), 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/700800/Han-in-Xinjiang-victims-of-
favorable-minority-policies.aspx.; Turgunjun Tursun, Whining From Majority About 
Affirmative Action Misplaced, GLOBAL TIMES, (Mar. 18, 2012), 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/700799/Whining-from-majority-about-
affirmative-action-misplaced.aspx. 
16  Ma Rong, Meiguo Ruhe Chuli Minzu Wenti [How America Deals With Ethnic 
Problems], NANFANG ZHOUMO (南方周末 )[SOUTHERN WEEKEND], (July 16, 2009), 
available at http://www.infzm.com/content/31554. 
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be Indian.  Movements and wars by India’s minority tribes are not 
internationalized and minorities do not threaten national unity.17 
Depoliticization aligns with classic (conservative) liberalism 
through a common dislike of group rights.18  Classic liberalism 
decries multiculturalism that “supports politicization of group 
identities, where the basis of the common identity is claimed to be 
cultural.”  It upholds John Stuart Mill’s ideal of a liberal democratic 
social contract founded on individual rights.19 
Chinese classic liberals also endorse individual rights, rather 
than group rights.20  The view of proponents of a “second generation 
of ethnic policies” can be equated with “liberal pluralism,” which 
“forbid[s] area exclusivism,” emphasizes “assimilation and 
acculturation,” and opposes a “corporate pluralism” that “tolerates 
area exclusivism” and “legitimates preferential treatment of 
different groups to equalize the distribution of resources.” 21  
Depoliticization’s alignment with classic liberalism is particularized 
by praise for Indian and U.S. ethnic policies.22 
                                                
17  Ma Rong, A New Perspective in Guiding Ethnic Relations in the 21st Century: 
Depoliticization of Ethnicity in China, 8 ASIAN ETHNICITY 199, 215-216, no. 3 (2007). 
18 Junning Liu, Classic Liberalism Catches on in China, 11 JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY, 
no.3, 48 (2000). “[T]he demand  . . . for recognition for segmental and differentiated 
collective right [is] something that violates the liberal notion of equality between sovereign 
and unencumbered individuals.”  See also Ephraim Nimni, National Autonomy in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIONALISM 212, 213 (ATHENA LEOSSI ed., 2001) 
19  Brian Barry, CULTURE AND EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF 
MULTICULTURALISM (2001) (Mill’s view of “minority rights” was that Basques and 
Bretons would remain half-savage relics who revolved in their own little mental orbit 
unless they became members of the French nation; so too for Welsh and Scots vis-à-vis the 
British nation.).  See J.S. Mill, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 314 (New York Prometheus 
1991) (1861).  See also John Stuart Mill, UTILITARIANISM: ON LIBERTY AND 
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 360-65 (J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 
1861) (Mill also wrote that “Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up 
of different nationalities . . . Among people without fellow-feeling, especially if they speak 
different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative 
government cannot exist.).  
20 See Feng Chongyi, Chinese Liberal Intellectuals' Attitudes Toward the Welfare Mix, 
Chinese Studies Association of Australia Conference, Sydney (2009); Jane Leung Larson, 
Charter 08’s Qing Dynasty Precursor, THE ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL: JAPAN FOCUS, (Jan. 
15, 2006), available at http://www.japanfocus.org/-Jane_Leung-Larson/3558. 
21 Jacqueline Simpson, Pluralism: the Evolution of a Nebulous Concept, 38 AMERICAN 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 459, 464 (1995). 
22 Non-classic liberals do not necessarily oppose collective rights for minorities.  A leading 
Canadian liberal political philosopher has urged states to “adopt various group-specific 
rights of policies which are intended to recognize and accommodate distinctive identities 
and needs of ethno-cultural groups.  WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR: 
NATIONALISM, MULTI-CULTURALISM AND CITIZENSHIP 42 (2001). 
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 The comparative evidence of the results of U.S. and Indian 
official approaches to ethnicity, set out below, shows, however, that 
minorities in the two big liberal democracies remain in subordinate 
and deteriorating positions and do not necessarily have higher levels 
of national identity or lower levels of political disaffection than 
China’s minorities.  Because the depoliticization movement’s 
proposed diminution of minority rights in China will alter the 
intersection of ethnicity, governance, and human rights in ways 
detrimental to minorities, it will likely increase, not assuage, 
instability, especially in Tibetan and Uygur areas. 
 The choice for ethnic policies in China, moreover, is not a 
binary of individual rights only or no change.  The expansion, rather 
than contraction or status quo, of minority rights should also be 
considered.  One possibility is to create structures, such as ethnic-
based associations that minorities could use to deal with matters 
material to their ethnicity, such as their histories and cultural 
elements (self-identity, language, and religion, etc.).  Such 
associations would also address their members’ positions within 
China’s political and social systems, including issues of inequality.  
These structures need not be counter-posed to the state or serve as 
mere vehicles for elites, but could instead focus on pervasive 
problems.  Self-representation may lead to more minority 
participation in China’s governance.  The integration, rather than 
assimilation, of minorities may mitigate separatism while raising the 
level of human rights by allowing minorities to pinpoint ways to 
diminish the social and economic gaps between themselves and 
Han.23 
 We first consider the putative model derived from India – 
a country often compared with China, but only exceptionally seen as 
a model for it – where ethnic minorities have the same proportion of 
the population as in China.  Next, we take up the supposed model of 
the United States, a much less populous, but more developed and 
more multi-ethnic, state, whose eschewing of collective rights 
Chinese liberals admire.  Reviewing comparative results, the claims 
of Indian and U.S. success made by proponents of a “second 
generation of ethnic policies” are shown to be empirically 
                                                
23 See generally Barry Sautman, Self Representation and Ethnic Minority Rights in China, 
15 ASIAN ETHNICITY (forthcoming 2014) (Explicating the concept of self-representation) 
[Note: Asian Ethnicity is a quarterly publication having 4 issues in one year. The first issue 
is already out. Request to check with author to find which quarter will his publication be 
slotted to come out] (please refer R. 17.3).   
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inaccurate, as the relative positions of minorities in those countries 
are often worse than in China.  For United States minorities, much 
of the gap is attributable to discrimination, and for Indian ethnic 
minorities, it is in large part due to plundering; for China’s 
minorities, though, the gap is mainly a function of location.  
Surveys also indicate that Indian and U.S. minorities have no 
greater level of national identity than Chinese minorities and in 
some respects actually have lower levels. 
 Despite the deficiencies of China’s ethnic policies, a move 
to a U.S. or Indian model would exemplify the Chinese idiom bing 
ji luan tou yi – to throw oneself randomly at any doctor in a medical 
crisis.  When that happens, the cure is often worse than the disease. 
 AN INDIAN MODEL? 
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has said his 
government has “respect for multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-
religious rights,”24 while proposals to depoliticize ethnicity in China 
claim success for India’s ethnic policies.  Ma Rong argues that there 
are no threatening separatist activities in India; insofar as separatism 
exists, it receives little global attention, and India is nationally 
united.25  Hao Shiyuan counters, however, that India cannot be a 
model because it is not a unified nation or state: deep animosities 
exist among ethnic groups, castes and even provinces, and society 
lacks a cohesive force.  Denying that India’s ethnic policies are 
depoliticized, he contends that efforts to deal with recurrent and 
newly-generated ethnic and caste conflict have been highly political 
and have failed because of strong resentment in Indian society based 
on extreme Hindu and “regional” nationalism, the lack of shared 
national consciousness, and intense and persistent ethnic and caste 
discrimination.26  
                                                
24 Varghese K. George, China’s Aggression Baffling: Manmohan, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Nov. 
24, 2009, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/china-s-aggression-baffling-
manmohan/article1-479568.aspx.  
25 Ma Rong, Yinyong wenxian buneng duan zang qu yi: Lianheguo kaifa jihuashu dui 
yindu ‘Minzu jiangou’ de pingjia (Citations should not be biased: the report of UNDP on 
Indian “nation building”), 3 Zhongyang minzu daxue xuebao (zhixue shehui kexue ban 
[zskb] 33, 52-54 (2006).  
26 Hao Shiyuan, Yindu goujian guojia minzu de ‘jingyan’ bu zhide Zhongguo xuexi (India’s 
“Experience” of Constructing National Ethnic Groups is not Worth Study by China), 
Minzu wenti yanjiu no. 2 67-79 (2013). 
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 Conditions of the Adivasi  
India’s ethnic minorities, officially termed adivasi (original 
people) or “Scheduled Tribes” (STs), number some 103 million and 
are about the same 8.6% of the population as minorities are in 
China.27  Most live not in remote frontier areas but in the heart of 
India.  About 90% of STs, compared to 69% of India’s total 
population, lived in rural areas in 2005.28  They have far higher 
illiteracy, unemployment and landlessness rates than Indians 
generally.29  STs “are more likely to be ill, less likely to be educated, 
more likely to cultivate land and more likely to live in a climate of 
fear and oppression.”30 Deprivation of STs includes: 
Poor physical access to services; increasing 
alienation of STs from their traditional lands; low 
voice and participation in political spaces; and poor 
implementation of public assistance-poverty 
reduction programs, which affects the STs 
disproportionately because they dominate the ranks 
of the poor and the disadvantaged.31 
 
Adivasi, in fact, are significantly worse off than India’s famous 
dalits or “untouchables.”32     
     Some 46% of rural and 36 % of urban adivasi lived below 
India’s very low poverty line in 2000, compared to 27% of rural 
                                                
27 STs Form 25% of Population, says Census 2011 Data, THE INDIAN EXPRESS, May 1, 
2013, http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/scs-sts-form-25--of-population-says-census-
2011-data/1109988. 
28 Maitreyi, Bordia, Das, et al., Indigenous People, Poverty and Development, in INDIA: 
THE SCHEDULED TRIBES 210-11 (Gillette Hall and Harry Patinos, eds. 2012). 
29 C.R. Bijoy, The Adivasi of India: a History of Discrimination, Conflict and Resistance, 
PUCL Bulletin, February 2003, http://www.pucl.org/Topics/Dalit-tribal/2003/adivasi.htm; 
Tribes Living in Stigma and Starvation, AHRC NEWS, June 4, 2009, 
http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-STM-129-2009/.  
30 Raghav Ghaia et al., Has Anything Changed? Deprivation, Disparity and Discrimination 
in Rural India 15(2) BROWN JOURNAL OF WORLD AFFAIRS 113-123 at 122 (2008); Sumeet 
Jain, Tightening India’s ‘Golden Straightjacket’: How Pulling the Straps of India’s Scheme 
Reflects Prudent Economic Policy, 8 WASH. UNIV. GLOBAL STUDIES L. REV. 567, 592 
(2009); Anand Teltumbde, Inequality and Affirmative Action, Episode 20: Pursuing 
Equality in the Land of Hierarchy: Positive Discrimination Policies in India, SOCIAL 
SCIENCE BAHA, (Nov. 10, 2013), http://soscbaha.org/about-conf/panelssessions/radio-
programme/459-episode-20.html. 
31 Maitreyi, Bordia, Das, et al. supra note 28, 8.   
32  Ramachandra Guha, Unacknowledged Victims, OUTLOOK INDIA (April 13, 2010), 
http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?265069. 
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Indians and 23% of Indians generally.33  The economic situation has 
worsened for STs since privatization of the Indian economy began 
in the early 1990s: “In 1993, 25% of those belonging to a [ST] fell 
into the poorest wealth decile.  By 2005, this figure had risen to 
30%.  Further, whereas 52% of the ST population fell into the 
poorest three deciles in 1993, this figure had risen to 64% by 
2005.”34 
    The Asian Center for the Progress of Peoples (ACPP) 
reports that: 
40.1 percent of the Adivasis are displaced;5 5.2 
percent of the Adivasis are under the below poverty 
line; 63.5 percent of the Adivasi households do not 
have electricity; 53.1 percent of the Adivasi 
households do not have drinking water source; 83 
percent of the Adivasi households do not have access 
to toilet facility; 56 percent of the Adivasi children 
are undernourished; 53 percent of the Adivasis are 
illiterate; 76 percent of the Adivasis do not have 
permanent houses; and 93 percent of the Adivasis do 
not possess land.35 
 
A survey of nutrition in Adivasi households in two states with 
relatively high concentrations of these ethnic minorities found that 
Out of a total 1000 sample Adivasi households from 
40 sample villages in Rajasthan and Jharkhand 
surveyed for this study, a staggering 99% were 
facing chronic hunger . . . 25.2% of surveyed 
Adivasi households had faced semi-starvation 
during the previous week of the survey.  This 
survey found that 24.1% of the surveyed Adivasi 
households had lived in semi-starvation condition 
throughout the previous month of the survey.  Over 
99% of the Adivasi households had lived with one 
or another level of endemic hunger and food 
                                                
33  Caste and Community Profile: People Below Poverty Line in India, WIKIMEDIA 
COMMONS. (Mar. 17, 2007), http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File: 
Caste_and_Community_of_Profile_People_below_povertyline_in_India.PNG. 
34 Maitreyi, et al., supra note 28.  See also David Ludden, Empire Meets Globalisation, 47 
ECONOMIC & POLITICAL WEEKLY 213, 221 (2012). 
35 Hotline Asia – Backgrounder on Situation of Adivasis in India, ACPP (Oct. 2009), 
www.acpp.org/uappeals/bground/Adivasis%20in%20SIndia.htm. 
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insecurity during the whole previous year. 
Moreover, out of 500 sample Adivasi households 
surveyed in Rajasthan, not a single one had secured 
two square meals for the whole previous year.36 
 
Moreover, “whether [it is] child mortality, malnutrition, 
immunization, contraception, pregnancy or maternal care – STs 
continue to exhibit worse outcomes vis-à-vis the national average 
and in comparison to non-STs.”37  In 2004-2005, 53% of STs had no 
education, compared to a third of non-STs.38  Prime Minister Singh 
has admitted that “[t]here has been systemic failure in giving tribals 
a stake in modern economic processes.”39  Reasons adumbrated for 
the “poor outcomes for STs. . . include (but are not limited to) poor 
physical access to services, widespread removal from their 
                                                
36 Political Economy of Hunger in Adivasi Areas, CENTRE FOR ENVIRONMENT AND FOOD 
SECURITY (New Delhi) (2005), www.cefs-
india.org/reports/Research%20Study%20on%20the%20Political%20Economy%20of%20 
Hunger%20in%20Adivasi%20(Tribal)%20Areas%20of%20India.pdf.  There are also 
underfed persons in China. A 2011 Gallup survey of 4,000 Chinese reported that 6% 
agreed “there have been times in the past 12 months when they did not have enough money 
to buy food that they or their family needed”; 19% of Americans polled in 2011 also 
agreed with that statement.  Rajesh Srinivasan and Bryant Ott, Chinese Struggling Less 
than Americans to Afford Basics, GALLUP WORLD, Oct. 12, 2011, 
www.gallup.com/poll/150068/chinese-struggling-less-americans-afford-basics.aspx.  
37 Das, et al., Indigenous People, Poverty and Development, in INDIA: THE SCHEDULED 
TRIBES 210-11 (Gillette Hall and Harry Patinos, eds. 2012). 
38 Maitreyi, Bordia, Das supra note 28, 231.  The ST under-five mortality in 2007 was 96 
per 1,000, but 74 for non-STs.  Surveys have shown that among STs living in 10 Indian 
states, 52% of children aged 1-5 were underweight, compared to 42% nationally.  The 
percentage of underweight Indian children is higher than in sub-Saharan Africa (30%) and 
much higher than in China (4%), although the percent of underweight children in China’s 
western provinces is twice as high as in its eastern provinces. See also id, 224-25; 
Malavika Vyawahare, Malnutrition Ravages India’s Children, N.Y. TIMES. Aug. 28, 2013, 
http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/28/malnutrition-ravages-indias-
children/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0; JACQUE DREZE & AMARTYA SEN, AN 
UNCERTAIN GLORY: INDIA AND ITS CONTRADICTIONS [Need Page Numbers] (2013); Pranab 
Bardhan, AWAKENING GIANTS, FEET OF CLAY: ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC RISE OF CHINA 
AND INDIA [Need page numbers] (2010): Claire Malamed, Putting Inequality in the Post-
2015 Picture, OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE 3, 7 (Mar. 2012), 
www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7599.pdf. 
India’s ST infant mortality rate of 62 per 1,000 is much higher than in Tibet (20.7). [not 
sure what to do with mortality rate info] Jonathan Kennedy and Lawrence King, 
Understanding the Conviction of Binayak Sen: Neocolonialism, Political Violence and the 
Political Economy of Health in the Central Indian Tribal Belt, 72 SOCIAL SCIENCE & 
MEDICINE 1640 (2011); Sixty Years since the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, STATE COUNCIL 
INFORMATION OFFICE (China), 1, 25 (2011), http://no.china-
embassy.org/eng/zyxw/t841187.htm.   
39 India Plans Offensive Against Rebels, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 9, 2009.  
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traditional lands and forests, poor enforcement of legislation meant 
to protect their interest, lack of collective voice, and poor 
implementation of government programs aimed to assist 
them . . . .”40  For example, from 1951 to 1990, 40% of the 21.3 
million Indians displaced from their land by state acquisition were 
STs.41 
     A team of scholars from India, Sweden and China who 
compared the relationship between poverty and minority status in 
India and China have concluded that 
Most of China’s poor belong to the Han majority, 
while most of India’s poor are Muslims or belong to 
the Scheduled Castes/Tribes.  Although our study 
found that the average minority-majority income gap 
in China and India were similar in magnitude, the 
results from our multivariate analysis indicated that 
much of the minority-majority divide in China was 
due to the fact that China’s majority population was 
located in its less developed western region.  In India 
there was evidence of the unfavorable treatment of 
minority group persons living in the same location as 
persons from the majority group.42 
 B. Kashmir, the Northeast, Religious Minorities 
     India’s policies for ethnic and religious minorities have been 
largely unsuccessful in Kashmir and much of the country’s 
Northeast (Nagaland, Assam, etc.).  Additionally, these policies 
have not been successful as applied to the 15% of the Indian 
population that is Muslim.  The situation is similarly poor even as to 
some non-minority language and regional groups.   
In Kashmir, where two-thirds of the population is Muslim, a 
two decade-long counter-insurgency against pro-independence 
forces deployed 500,000 Indian troops, cost 70,000 lives and 
entailed huge economic and social costs to the state, which now has 
severely under-endowed infrastructure and state services compared 
                                                
40 Das, et al., Indigenous People, Poverty and Development, in INDIA: THE SCHEDULED 
TRIBES 210-1 (Gillette Hall and Harry Patinos, eds. 2012). 
41 Das, et al., Indigenous People, Poverty and Development, in INDIA: THE SCHEDULED 
TRIBES 236-7 (Gillette Hall and Harry Patinos, eds. 2012). 
42 Vani Borooah et al., China and India: Income Inequality and Poverty North and South of 
the Himalayas, 17 JOURNAL OF ASIAN ECONOMICS 797, 817 (2006). 
2014] U.S./INDIA MODEL FOR CHINA’S ETHNIC POLICIES          103 
 
to the rest of India.4344  The vast majority of the dead have been 
Muslims, with thousands of them civilians murdered by the army 
and police and dumped into mass graves found as fighting finally 
dwindled in 2011.45  There was also a pogrom in Kashmir46 in which 
Muslims murdered 260 Hindus47 and caused the largest mass exodus 
since the 1947 partition of the sub-continent, 48  with 100,000-
150,000 Hindus fleeing the Kashmir valley.49 
 Human rights groups say extra-judicial killings and rapes of 
Muslims50 by impunity-bearing Indian security forces51 have been 
endemic.52  A 2012 report by a Kashmiri human rights lawyer said 
“not only is torture endemic, it is systemic.  In one cluster of 50 
villages, more than 2,000 extreme cases of torture were 
documented.”53  One study found “ample evidence that Muslims in 
[Jammu & Kashmir] are poorer than Hindus and Sikhs on the basis 
of all indicators considered.”54  The Kashmir issue is regionalized: 
neighboring countries control parts of what India regards as its state 
of Jammu & Kashmir.  Pakistan controls “Azad [Free] Kashmir,” 
while China regards the uninhabited Aksai Chin as its territory.  The 
Kashmir issue is also internationalized, as the world’s media, 
especially in Muslim lands, give it significant attention.  Kashmir 
has globally been a much better-known issue than Xinjiang, except 
for a short time after the 2009 riot in Xinjiang’s capital, Urumqi.55 
                                                
43 Debidatta Mahapatra & Shailender Shekhawat, Kashmir Conflict: Causes, Costs and 
Prospects of Peace. 
44 Seena Shekhawat & Debidda Mahapatra, AFRO-ASIAN CONFLICTS: CHANGING CONTOURS, 
COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES 151-160 (Delhi: New Century Publication, 2008). 
45 Id. 
46 Amrit Dhillon, Few Kashmiri Pandits Tempted by Generous Offers to Return Home, 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Sep. 21, 2009. 
47 Kashmir, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 25, 2012, available at 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/kashmir/index.htm 
48 Robert Wirsing, KASHMIR: IN THE SHADOW OF WAR (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 2004) 
(showing how fighting abated in 2011, but police violence against protestors continued).  
49 Curbs, Strike Shut Valley Down, KASHMIR OBSERVER, Feb. 22, 2013. 
50 Izhar Wani, Violence in Kashmir Dips to Record Low: Police, AFP, Aug. 31, 2009.  
51 Lydia Polgreen, Two Killings Stoke Kashmiri Rage at Indian Force, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES, Aug. 16, 2009 (showing that “In Kashmir, separatist tendencies were least when 
democracy and autonomy were strongest.”) 
52  Deepa M. Ollapally, The Politics of Extremism in South Asia 116 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008).  
53 Cathy Scott-Clark, The Mass Graves of Kashmir, THE GUARDIAN, Jul. 9, 2012. 
54 Ajit Bhalla, et al., Social Discontent and Minorities in China and India, CENTER FOR 
RESEARCH AND DEBATES IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY, Discussion Paper 73, July 2011.  
55 Id. at 26 (finding that “In Xinjiang, both poverty incidence and income inequality are 
greater among the Han majority than among Muslim minority (Uygur). Poverty and 
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It has been noted that “there are increasingly violent 
insurgent movements in tribal areas.  A recent [2008] Planning 
Commission report links these movements squarely to 
underdevelopment and marginalization of STs.”56  Multiple ethnic-
based insurgencies exist around India, 57  but especially in the 
Northeast where more than 16 million adivasi live, with some 
insurgencies ongoing for as long as six decades and costing tens of 
thousands of lives:58 
[T]he centralized power of the Indian state is 
repeatedly questioned in the Northeast of that 
country, where several ethnic groups live in eight 
states.  Also questioned is its management of the 
problems of dissent and political identity and 
especially the question of ‘one nation,’ with an 
emphasis on homogeneity.59  
 
The Extrajudicial Victim Families Association, Manipur has 
presented courts a list of 1,528 victims of extrajudicial police 
killings in that Northeast state from 2007-2012.60  The conflict 
involving two million Nagas in the Northeast dates to India’s 
independence in 1947, when Naga leaders sought a separate state.  
The conflict has since been internationalized, involving at various 
times the United States, Burma, China, Bangladesh and Pakistan.61  
Many Naga leaders reject that Nagas are Indian.62  A 2004 survey in 
Nagaland found that 57% of respondents identified as “only Naga,” 
                                                                                                           
inequality indicators are lower for Xinjiang than for J&K. Rural-urban disparities in per 
capita consumption are minimal in Xinjiang compared to the rest of Chin”).  
56 Das, supra note 28. 
57 See generally India: The Land of the Largest Number of Separatist Movements in the 
World, SINLUNG (Aug. 16, 2012)  http://www.sinlung.com/2012/08/india-land-of-largest-
number-of.html. 
58Northeast India Clashes, REUTERS, Oct. 22, 2008, www.alertnet.org/db/crisisprofiles/IN_ 
CLA.htm?v=in_detail (showing that Naga insurgency leaders have claimed 200,000 Nagas 
have been killed); see also Luke Harding, Naga Rebels Declare End of War with India, 
THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 14, 2003. 
59  Charles Chasie & Sanjoy Hazarika, The State Strikes Back: India and the Naga 
Insurgency, EAST-WEST CENTER POLICY STUDIES 52, 2009, at viii. 
60 Hari Kumar, Supreme Court to Investigate Police Killings in Manipur, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2012. 
61  Dinesh Kotwal, The Naga Insurgency: The Past And The Future, 24 STRATEGIC 
ANALYSIS (IDSA) (2000); see also Sanjay Baruah, Durable Disorder: Understanding the 
Politics of Northeast India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005) (discussing the 
Northeast’s insurgencies). 
62 See, e.g., Kaka D. Iralu, Naga Issue: Internal Indian Ethnic Conflict or a Conflict 
between Two Nations? IMPHAL FREE PRESS (India), Jan. 30, 2012.  
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9% as “only Indian” and 34% as “Indian and Naga.” 63   An 
anthropologist who has done fieldwork among Nagas has noted 
For the Naga, "Indians" are people from non-
Northeastern part of India, who also compose of the 
people of India; "India" is the country where "Indian" 
people live.  For the Naga, they are not ethnically 
"Indians" and they are not "Indian" either, although 
they are technically Indian nationals.64 
 
Northeasterners may reject Indian identity in part because of racism 
directed against them.  Many “mainland” Indians call East Asian-
appearing Northeasterners by the British anti-Chinese epithet 
“Chinki” and often do not regard them as Indians.65  Violent conflict 
in the Northeast is now only intermittent, but that is because Indian 
federal authorities have been put into place and tolerate autocratic 
“local regimes of corruption and repression.”66  
In India, the term “minorities” is used not for ethnic groups, 
which are STs, but for non-Hindu religious groups, such as Sikhs 
and Muslims.  India repelled Sikh separatists seeking an 
independent Punjab in the 1980s and 1990s.  A massive pogrom 
against Sikhs followed the retaliatory assassination of PM Indira 
Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards in 1984, causing 7,000 deaths.67  
That was followed widespread killings by security forces that 
peaked in the early 1990s, racking up a total of perhaps 20,000 
deaths.68  Punjab is still said to be “perhaps [India’s] most separatist 
[area] outside of the internationally disputed territory of Kashmir.”69 
                                                
63  Alfred Stephan et al., Crafting State-Nations: Indian and Other Multinational 
Democracies 108, fn. 35 (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011) (discussing how 
even in neighboring Mizoram, where a post-insurgency high degree of autonomy has been 
in place since 1986, 32% of respondents to a 2003 survey identified as “only Mizo”).  
64 Satoshi Ota, Ethnic Identity and Consumption of Popular Culture among Young Naga 
People, India, 7:3 IJAPS :65, 53-75 (2011). 
65  Northeast Students Make Merry after Mary Kom’s Olympic Feat, DAILY NEWS & 
ANALYSIS, Aug. 10, 2012, available at http://www.dnaindia.com/sport/report-northeast-
students-make-merry-after-mary-koms-olympic-feat-1726173. 
66 See Bethany Lacina, The Problem of Political Stability in Northeast India, 46:4 ASIAN 
SURVEY 998-1020 (2009). 
67 Lily, RS Admits Calling Attention Notice, RIGHT VISION NEWS, Nov. 26, 2009. 
68 Dhami, supra note 2. 
69 Henry Hale, A Political Economy of Secessionism in Federal Systems, May 2002, 
www.core.ucl.acbe/PolIntDes/papers/Hale.pdf. 
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In 2002, more than 2,700 Muslims were brutally murdered 
in a pogrom in the far western state of Gujarat.70  The state’s leader 
then and now has been Narenda Modi, who failed to act against and 
even justified the pogrom.  He was thereafter shunned for a while by 
European Union states, but that ban was lifted in 2012 by the 
“mother of democracies,” Britain, in order to promote the interests 
of BP, British Gas and other firms “with substantial interests in 
Gujarat.”71  In 2013, Modi became leader for the 2014 national 
electoral campaign of India’s main opposition party, the “Hindu 
nationalist” Bharatiya Janata Party.72  Expectedly, jihadi groups such 
as the Indian Mujahideen, inspired by Gulf-based organizations, 
emerged in India in the 2000s and have killed hundreds of people, 
mainly through bombings.73 
There have also been smaller-scale pogroms against Indian 
Christians, language and region-based persecution among Hindus, 
and caste discrimination which, while not ethnic, is analogous and 
severe.74 
 Adivasis and Maoist Insurgency  
Indian Maoists are mainly based among mainland Indian 
adivasis.  Links between Maoists and Kashmir and Northeast 
separatists have also been reported.75  Said to number 100,000 in 
armed militia, Maoists operate in 22 of India’s 28 states. They killed 
900 police in 2005-2009.76  By 2007, 6,000 people had died in the 
                                                
70 Francis Elliott, Anger at UK Talks with Leader Who Stood By During Riots, THE TIMES, 
Oct. 23, 2012. 
71 Id.  
72 Lakshmi Rama, India’s Nationalist Opposition Names Controversial Hindu Leader to 
Lead Campaign, WASHINGTON POST, June 9, 2013. 
73Profile: Indian Mujahideen, BBC, Aug. 29, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
india-23876150; Jethro Mullen & Neha Sharma, Indian Arrests Yasin Bahtktal, Indian 
Mujahideen Terrorism Suspect, CNN, Aug. 29, 2013, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/29/world/asia/india-terrorist-arrest/. 
74 Arundhati Roy, Listening To Grasshoppers: Field Notes On Democracy 3-8, 150-151, 
184-185 (Hamish Hamilton 2009) 
75 Antony: No Army Troops To Fight Maoists, UPI, Nov. 2, 2009; B. Vijah Murty, If 
Taliban Attacks India, We’ll Fight Them, Say Maoists, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Oct. 20, 2009, 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/Print/467031.aspx?s=p; Official: India’s 
Maoist Rebels Expand Influence, AP, Sept. 15, 2009 
76 Thomas Marks, Return of the Beast: Maoist Insurgency Lives, 15 J. OF COUNTER-
TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY, 2009 at 3; Jim Yardley, Rebels Widen Deadly 
Reach Across India, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 1, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/01/world/asia/01maoist.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; 
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insurgency, including 1,300 insurgents and 2,900 civilians, mostly 
STs.  Maoists killed 1,700 police and police-supported militiamen in 
the Bastar district of Chhattisgarh, a state where the Indian 
government is particularly active in assisting land grabs by “some of 
the most powerful industrial empires in India: Jindal Power & Steel 
and Tata Steel” 77 and where “sovereignty is contested over large 
parts of terrain.”78 
An Indian anthropologist has specified “the driving forces 
for the current civil war as including sharpening inequality, 
strengthened rent seeking among business people and politicians in 
two states with high ST concentrations, a liberalized national 
mining policy, and a growing emphasis on industrialization which 
displaces adivasi and other rural people.”79  The 180 districts in 10 
states where Maoists now “hold sway” are 40% of the country’s 
territory, four times that of 2001.80  Most Maoist cadres are adivasi 
or dalit and most of their strongholds are in ST areas,81 but the 
mobilization focus varies: in Chhattisgarh and West Bengal it is 
tribal rights; in Orissa and Jharkhand it is mostly mining firm 
infringement; in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Haryana it is caste and 
land; and in Punjab, water.82 
  India’s Home Ministry has said Maoists “espouse local 
demands” based on “prevalent dissatisfaction and feelings of 
perceived neglect and injustice among underprivileged and remote 
segments of the population.”83   An anti-terrorism specialist has 
                                                                                                           
Cabinet Nod for anti-Naxal Force, INDIAN EXPRESS, Aug. 28, 2008, 
http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/cabinet-nod-for-antinaxal-force/354300/  
77  Senior Maoist ‘arrested’ in India, BBC, Dec. 19, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7151552.stm; Megha Bahree, The Forever War: 
Inside India’s Maoist Conflict, 27 WORLD POL’Y J. 83, 83-89; On this epicenter of the 
Maoist insurgency, see Nandini Sundar, Subalterns and Sovereigns: an Anthropological 
History of Bastar 1854-2006 (Oxford University Press, 2007); Jason Motlagh, The Maoists 
in the Forests: Tracking India’s Separatist Rebels, VIRGINIA Q. REV., Jul. 2008, at 102-129.  
78 Nandini Sundar, Insurgency, Counter-insurgency and Democracy in Central India, in 
MORE THAN MAOISM: POLITICS, POLICIES AND INSURGENCIES IN SOUTH ASIA 149-168 
(Robin Jeffrey et al. eds., 2012). 
79 Sundar, supra note 68 at 151. 
80 Army not to be Used Against Naxals, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Oct. 12, 2009, 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/mumbai/army-not-to-be-used-against-naxals-
pm/article1-464026.aspx; Sundar, supra note 68 at 150.  See also Amulya Ganguli, Battle 
against Maoists Being Undermined by Intellectuals, INDO-ASIAN NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 17, 
2009 (Maoists in 231 of India’s 626 districts). 
81 Id.  
82 Sudeep Chakravarti, RED SUN: TRAVELS IN NAXALITE COUNTRY (Penguin/Viking, 2008). 
83 Ministry of Home Affairs, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNION MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, 
at 15-6 (Government of India, 2009). 
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stated that general public sympathy for Maoists “is relatively 
strong . . . because inequalities and injustices of society are blatantly 
obvious and the Maoists have been very effective at tapping into 
resentments of controversial government actions like the acquisition 
of tribal land for mining projects.”84  An historian who writes about 
adivasi and is anti-Maoist nevertheless observed that “the Maoists 
are prepared to walk miles to hold a village meeting, and listen 
sympathetically to tribal grievances . . . .  That the Maoists live 
among, and in the same state of penury as the tribals, is 
unquestionable.  That some of their actions have sometimes helped 
the adivasis can also be conceded.”85 
     In a 2010 survey in 36 districts of seven states affected by 
the Maoist insurgency, 10% of respondents said they were Maoist 
sympathizers, while an additional 37% expressed “mild 
sympathy.” 86   The survey takers concluded that “Adivasis 
sympathize as much as the rest.”87  In Andhra Pradesh, a major state 
in which it was thought the Maoists had been wiped out through 
repression, a 2010 Times of India (TOI) poll found that 58% of a 
random sample agree that “Naxalism” [Maoism] had been good for 
their area.88  Prime Minister Singh terms the Maoists “the biggest 
homegrown threat to India's internal security” and admits that the 
campaign against them is failing.89  Indeed, in the view of many 
adivasi, the biggest threat to the STs has been the Indian state and 
the civilian militias it employs to wage war on them.  
Adivasi do, however, have “special privileges” under the 
Constitution’s Schedules V (areas where the majority of the 
population are STs) and VI (northeast India) and 
Several well-known state-sponsored commissions 
have recommended greater voice for STs in their 
own development, and underscore the importance 
of land and forest in this process.  Of late, the state 
                                                
84 Jason Overdorf, India’s Hidden War Heats Up, GLOBALPOST, Sept. 24, 2009, 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/india/090921/indias-hidden-war-heats. 
85 Guha, supra note 32. 
86 Id.  
87 State of the Nation Survey: 2010, Aug. 2010, 
www.lokniti.org/state_of_the_nations_survey_august_2010.html. 
88 58% in AP say Naxalism is Good, Finds TOI Poll, TOI, Sept. 28, 2010 (This support 
was expressed though such polls were carried out in places where security forces have 
“penalized anything that could be construed as support for the Maoists.”); Sundar, supra 
note 68 at 161. 
89 India’s Fight Against Maoists Failing says Manmohan, DAILY TIMES (India), Sept. 16, 
2009. 
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has legislated to acknowledge the ‘rights’ of ST 
areas by taking them further toward self-rule . . . 
[T]here are earmarked development funds from 
both the central government and the states that flow 
to tribal areas through a special budgetary 
instrument called the ‘tribal sub-plan’ (TSP).  STs 
also have quotas in public employment, with 7.5% 
seats in all government and quasi-government jobs 
(which form the major part of all regular salaried 
jobs) reserved for them.  They have similar quotas 
in public educational institutions and . . . reserved 
seats in local governments [but] enforcement of 
these far-reaching laws and policies has been weak 
for a variety of reasons . . . .90 
 
Adivasis are thus by no means “depoliticized” and it is strikingly 
inaccurate to imply that they have no rights beyond the individual 
rights proclaimed by the Indian constitution for all citizens.  The 
STs’ collective rights or preferential policies are inscribed in law, 
but their effect is mainly seen in urban areas.  STs’ incomes there 
match those of the “forward classes” (general castes),91 yet only a 
tenth of STs are urban.  Chinese proponents of a second generation 
of ethnic policies in effect seek to centralize rights by 
individualizing them and making them uniform throughout the 
country.  Studies indicate, however, that when Indian leaders have 
opted for re-centralization, they were more likely to fail to 
accommodate ethnic and territorial cleavages and thus increase 
disaffection among ethnic groups.92 
India’s security issues involving minorities are at least as 
serious as those in Tibet and Xinjiang, calling into question claims 
that India has greater national unity than China.93  Surveys support 
                                                
90 Das, supra note 28, at 208-9. 
91 Das, supra note 28, at 221-2. 
92  Atul Kohli, India: Federalism and the Accommodation of Ethnic Nationalism, in 
FEDERALISM AND TERRITORIAL CLEAVAGES 281-300 (Ugo Amoretti & Nancy Bermeo eds. 
2004). 
93 Exiles assert Tibetans and Uygurs do not at all identify with China. The Dalai Lama has 
said that “Not a single Tibetan consider themselves as Chinese.” Tibetans Open to Talks 
with China, AFP, Nov. 17, 2009.  Reportedly however “10,000 pro-Chinese Tibetans” 
gathered in Lhasa in 2009 to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the abolition of Tibet’s 
serfdom. For Tibetans in Exile, the ‘End of Slavery’ is Nothing but Propaganda, ASIA 
NEWS, Mar. 28, 2009, http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l= en&art=14849&size=A.  In 
2004, the Communist Party in the TAR had 120,000 members, 72,000 of them Tibetan.  
110 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW    Vol. 9 
 
that view as well.  In a 2009, 33-country poll, measuring “trust, 
admiration, respect and pride in [the participants’] country,” Indians 
and Chinese came out virtually the same, with the sixth and seventh 
highest rates of admiration for their countries.94  In a 2005 survey on 
“pride in India” in which the all-India total of “very proud” and 
“proud” was 89%, the result for STs was lower, 77%.  That has 
been explained to be “partly because these groups fail[] to 
understand the question (itself a reflection of the uneven 
dissemination of the idea of nationalism in modern India) and partly 
because they are genuinely less enthusiastic about Indian 
nationalism.”95  Indeed, a large 2010 survey found that 18% of a 
random sample of Indians “did not even know the name of their 
country.”96  The figure equally applied to illiterates, many of whom 
are STs.  A sixth of those polled identified only by their ethnicity, 
state (i.e. province) or religion and not as Indians.97  
Subjective attitudes toward national unity in China and India 
thus may be rather similar, but overall, disaffection among ethnic 
minorities in India seems higher than in China.  Chinese generally 
are moreover much more satisfied with the direction their country is 
going (83%) than are Indians (38%), according to a 2012 Pew 
survey.  If that continues, there may be a greater chance of long-
lived national coherence in China than in India.98  
 THE UNITED STATES AS EXEMPLARY? 
 Pervasive Racialization 
Opponents of depoliticization have strongly interrogated 
claims that the United States has largely unproblematic ethnic 
policies and strenuously argue that the United States cannot be a 
proper model for Chinese policy.  This argument is premised on the 
claim that, unlike China, the United States has a society that needs 
                                                                                                           
Harish Chandola, Communist Party Controls Tibet, Times of India (TOI), INDIA TIMES, Jul. 
30, 2004, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2004-07-31/rest-of-
world/27146459_1_renminbi-tibetan-communist-party. 
94 National Pride, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 29, 2009.   
95 Alfred Stepan et al., Crafting State-Nations 69 (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001)  
96 Id.  
97 Sanjay Kumar & Yogendra Yadav, Indians not Chauvinist, Hate Hegemony, CNN-IBN-
Hindustan Times State of the Nation survey, 2011, 
http://ibnlive.in.com/features/rday/stgateofthenation/natioal.php. 
98 Muneeza Naqvi, Survey: Indians Disappointed with Economy, Gov’t, Associated Press, 
Sept. 11, 2012.  The figure for the U.S. was 29%. Id. 
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to consolidate disparate immigrant groups, and tha political elites 
have done so by claiming perpetual threats to a vaunted and 
universalized political system and way of life.  It has also been 
argued, contrary to what proponents of depoliticization assert, that 
the United States does have explicit ethnic policies, such as 
affirmative action.99 
  In fact, the United States has few ethnic policies, even in 
terms of multiculturalism and even compared to less multi-ethnic 
liberal democracies.  Scholars at Canada’s Queens University who 
measured the presence of multiculturalist policies applied to 
national minorities in 21 liberal democracies have shown that in 
2010 the United States was behind or far behind all countries 
surveyed except France and Japan, the two states among those 
surveyed that, in effect, refuse to officially recognize the existence 
of their national minorities.100 
With U.S. political elites generally unconcerned with the 
promotion of multiculturalism, let alone ethnic equality, everything 
consequential in the United States remains racialized.  Take, for 
example, opinions about the major U.S. issue of health care.  A 
2009-2010 survey showed that racial attitudes had a much larger 
impact on such views than was shown by polls taken before 
President Obama became associated with the policy.101  The racial 
divide in health care views was 20% greater in 2009 than for similar 
policies that President Clinton had proposed in 1993-1994.102  Thus, 
it is reasonable to conclude that some of the opposition to 
“Obamacare” stems from racist viewpoints toward President Obama. 
Issues ranging from Obama’s nomination of a Supreme 
Court Justice to the likeability of his dog have been similarly 
racialized,103 but racialization of views on health care stands out, as 
                                                
99 Hao Shiyuan, Meiguo minzu zhengce bu shi Zhongguo de bangyang [The U.S.’s ethnic 
policies are not a model for China], HUANQIU RIBAO, July 13, 2012, 
http://opinion.huanqiu.com/1152/2012-07/2910028.html. 
100 Multiculturalism Policy Index, www.queeenu.ca./mcpi/; last accessed Oct. 29, 2012. 
101 Id.  
102 Michael Tesler, The Spillover of Racialization into Health Care: How President Obama 
Polarized Opinion by Racial Attitudes and Race, 56 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 690, 691 (2012) 
103  Sasha Issenberg, It All Comes Down to Race, SLATE, June 1, 2012, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/victory_lab/2012/06/racicalization_micha
el_tesler_s_theory_that_all_political_positions_come_down_to_racial_bias_.html.  Ethnic 
polarization was also seen in the 2012 U.S. Presidential election. White people were 71%, 
black people 12%, Latinos 11% and others 6% of eligible voters. William Frey, Why 
Minorities will Decide the 2012 U.S. Election, BROOKINGS, May, 2012, 
www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/05/01-race-elections-frey.  Some 40% of 
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the health problems of most minorities are far worse than those of 
white people.  For example, black people are seven times more 
likely than white people to be HIV infected, with African American 
women 23 times more likely than white women, mainly because the 
rate of the HIV infection is seven times higher in prison than outside 
and the incarceration rate of black people is almost seven times that 
of white people (see below).104  Similarly, a 2012 study of cardiac 
arrests found that in low-income black neighborhoods, the odds of 
bystander-initiated cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) is 50% 
lower than in high-income non-black neighborhoods.105  Regardless 
of the character of the neighborhood where cardiac arrest takes 
place, black people and Latinos are 30% less likely than white 
people to receive CPR from a bystander and many die as a result.106 
 Poverty, Incarceration, and Discrimination  
The only U.S. practices aimed at ameliorating 
white/minority gaps -- affirmative action (preferential policies) and 
a putatively inclusive political process -- have in recent decades 
mainly not been ameliorative.  Disparities remain huge and the 
position of African Americans has generally worsened.  In 2009, 
7.1% of white people and 12.7% of black people were unemployed; 
in 2012, the figures were 7.4% and 14.1%.107  Due to the long 
history of enforced marginality of black labor, direct discrimination 
has been joined by a relative lack of job networks, which has 
ensured a high rate of African American unemployment.108  That 
applies after higher education as well: joblessness for African 
American college graduates is nearly twice as high as for their white 
                                                                                                           
white people, but 80% of minorities (93% of black people; 70% of Latinos and Asian 
Americans) voted for Barack Obama.  Minorities Came Out in Droves for Obama, CNN, 
Nov. 8, 2012, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1211/08/sitroom.02.html; Face 
of U.S. Changing, AP, Nov. 12, 2012, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/face-us-changing-
elections-look-different-0. 
104 Sadhbh Walshe, Incarceration: When HIV Infection does Discriminate, GUARDIAN, 
June 21, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jun/21/incarceration-hiv-
infection- discrimination/print. 
105 Comilla Sasson, et al., Association of Neighborhood Characteristics with Bystander-
initiated CPR, 367 NEW ENGLAND J. MEDICINE 1607, 1613 (2012). 
106 Id. 
107 First Black President Can’t Help Blacks Stem Wealth Drop, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 6, 
2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2012-09-05/first-black-president-can-t-help-
blacks-stem-wealth-drop.html. 
108 Deidre Royster, Race and the Invisible Hand: How White Networks Exclude Black Men 
from Blue-Collar Jobs (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). 
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counterparts.109  There is evidence from the U.S.’s gigantic retail 
sector that both the racial/ethnic preferences of non-black managers 
and lesser job networks continue to diminish hiring opportunities for 
black people.110   
The official African American poverty rate was 22.5% in 
2000; in 2012, 28% of African Americans and 37% of black 
children were poor, compared with 25.3% of Latinos and 34.1% of 
Latino children, and 10% of white people and 13% of white 
children.111  Black household income was 63% that of white people 
in 1999, but only 55% in 2011.112  From 2009 to 2012, African 
American household income fell over 11.1%, twice the percentage 
fall in white income.113   
The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the 
world,730 people behind bars per 100,000 inhabitants in 2010, 
compared to 114 in neighboring Canada and 170 (imprisoned or 
detained) in China as of 2009.114  The 2.3 million U.S. incarcerated 
exceed the total incarcerated in the 35 largest European states.115  
The number of United States incarcerations is up 350% since 1970, 
                                                
109 Your Wallet, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Apr. 23, 2009, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1N1-
127C198FB4F0A0A8.html. 
110 Laura Giulano, et al., Manager Race and the Race of New Hires, 27 J. LAB. ECON., 589, 
626 (2009).  In stores outside the South, changing from a black to a white manager 
typically leads to a proportional decline of 15% in black employment in the store, while the 
effect in the South is much greater.  Change from a white to a black manager increases by 
15% the rate at which white people quit.   
111 Algernon Austin, Three Lessons about Black Poverty, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, 
Sept. 18, 2009, www.epi.org/publication/the_lessons_of_black_poverty/; Frederick C. 
Harris, The Price of a Black President, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 28, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/28/opinion/sunday/the-price-of-a-black- 
president.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0&pagewanted=print; Tami Luhby, Median Income 
Falls, So Does Poverty, CNN, Sept. 12, 2012, 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/09/12/news/economy/median-income-poverty; Information on 
Poverty and Income Statistics, APSE Issue Brief, Sept. 12, 2012, 
aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/12/povertyandincomeest/ib.shtml. 
112 Robert Ross, Poverty More than a Matter of Black and White, INEQUALITY.ORG, Oct. 8, 
2012, http://inequality.org/poverty-matter-black-white/.  
113 Patrik Jonsson, Will Black Voters Give Obama What he Needs in Southern Swing 
Votes?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 5, 2012, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Elections/President/2012/1005/Will-black-voters-give-
Obama-what-he-needs-in-Southern-swing-states. 
114 International Centre for Prison Studies, University of Essex, UK, World Prison Brief, 
2012, 
www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_stats.php?area=northam&category=wb_popto
tal.  The U.S. has about 20 million felons, with 1.5 million of them currently in prison. 
Candidates Ignore Captive Audience, South China Morning Post (SCMP), Oct. 26, 2012. 
115  Albert R. Hunt, A Country of Inmates, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/us/21iht-letter21.html?pagewanted=print. 
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although the U.S. population has grown only 33% in that same 
timespan.116  Incarceration doubled in 1995-2010 alone, although the 
number of violent crimes has scarcely increased after 1980 and 
property crime has fallen sharply.117 
Some 62% of persons incarcerated in the United States are 
either Black (44%) or Latino (18%), while these groups make up 
just 13% and 15% of U.S. adults, respectively.  Three-fourths of 
those behind bars for drug offenses are persons of color.118  In 2007, 
among U.S. adults, 9.2% of black people, 3.7% of Latinos, and 
2.2% of white people were in the corrections system (prison, jail, 
probation and supervision).119  Some 11% of black males aged 25-
34 were incarcerated as of June, 2006.120  Among male adults, 16% 
of black people, 8% of Latinos and 3% of white people had served 
prison time at some point in their life.121  Black men are more likely 
to go to prison than graduate with a four-year college degree or 
complete military service. 122   Young black males without high 
school diplomas are more likely to be in prison than working.123  
Among young men without high school diplomas born in 1975-
1979, 68% of black people, but 28% of white people, had been 
imprisoned at some point by 2009 and 37% of black people, but 
12% of white people, were incarcerated that year.124 A black boy 
                                                
116 Id.  
117  Nake Kamrany and Ryan Boyd, U.S. Incarceration Rate is a National Disgrace, 
HUFFPOST, Apr. 13, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nake-m-kamrany/incarceration- 
rate_b_1423822.html?view=print&comm_ref=false 
118 Id.; Chinta Strausberg, The Sentencing Project Calls for an Overhaul of the Criminal 
Justice System, COPYLINE NEWS MAGAZINE (Apr. 2, 2011), 
http://www.copylinemagazine.com/news/ 2011/04/02/the-sentencing-project-calls-for-an-
overhaul-of-the-criminal-justice-system/ (explaining that the Latino incarceration rate is 
not greatly disproportionate because many Latinos are immigrants and immigrants are 45% 
less likely than third generation Americans to commit violent crimes); Marc Parry, The 
Neighborhood Effect, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (Nov. 5, 2012), 
http://chronicle.com/article/The-Neighborhood-Efect/135492/. 
119 PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 
(2009),  http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/PSPP_1in31_report_FINAL 
_3-26-09.pdf. 
120 Carlos Gradín, Poverty among Minorities in the United States: Explaining the Racial 
Poverty Gap for Blacks and Latinos, 44:29 APPLIED ECON. 3793-3804 (2011).  
121 Steven Raphael, Causes and Labor-Market Consequences of the Steep Increase in U.S. 
Incarceration Rates, in LABOR IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 375, 392-4 (Clair Brown et 
al. eds., 2010). 
122 Id.  
123 Id. 
124 Becky Pettit, Invisible Men: Mass Incarceration and the Myth of Black Progress (2012). 
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born in 2001 is projected to have a 1 in 3 chance of going to prison; 
a Latino boy a 1 in 6 chance; and a White boy a 1 in 17 chance.125 
In part, racial differences in offending, and therefore in 
incarceration, are directly tied to social status disparities and black 
inner-city residence.  A U.S. criminologist has observed: 
[S]tatus and residential differences, and the crimes 
they foster, are the legacy of historic, deliberate 
racial bias, combined with a willful blindness that 
allows the modern products of that bias to continue 
and in some ways grow worse.  In particular, city, 
county, and metro-level policies regarding schools, 
housing, transportation, and other public services 
and subsidies have often worsened, and rarely tried 
to ameliorate, criminogenic concentrations of race 
and poverty . . . .  The criminal justice system’s 
response to crime in poor, nonwhite areas magnifies 
and perpetuates differences in socioeconomic status 
and criminal behavior.126   
    
     Direct discrimination in arrests and sentencing play a large 
role in racial disparities in incarceration.  Ernest Drucker, a 
specialist on the effects of mass incarceration has noted that “there 
is no evidence that drug use is dramatically different by race or 
ethnicity, but the pattern of arrests is very different,”127 African 
American arrestees for drug and property crimes, which account for 
60% of all imprisonments, are jailed at three and two times the rates 
for white arrestees.  Disparities also stem from mandatory minimum 
sentencing requirements and laws that force judges to especially 
apply higher sentences to crimes more likely to be committed by 
black people, such as possession of crack (solid) cocaine, as 
opposed to powdered cocaine white people are more likely to use.128  
As to sentencing, studies have found that:  
                                                
125 CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND, ANNUAL REPORT 2007, at 22 (2007).  
126 Robert S. Frase, What Explains Persistent Racial Disproportionality in Minnesota’s 
Prison and Jail Populations?, in 38 CRIME AND JUST.: A REV. OF RES. 201, 263 (2009). 
127 Paul Harris, Obama’s Presidency ‘Has Not Helped the Cause of Black People in U.S.’, 
OBSERVER (Oct. 13, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/13/barack-obama-
presidency-black-people/print. 
128 Paige M. Harrison & Allen J. Beck, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Prison and Jail Inmates at 
Mid-Year 2005 9 (2006); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
46 (Rebecca M. Blank et al., 2004); Pamela E. Oliver, Racial Disparities in Imprisonment: 
Some Basic Information, 21:3 FOCUS 28, 28-31 (2001).  
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• Young, black and Latino males (especially if unemployed) are 
subject to particularly harsh sentencing compared to other 
offender populations; 
 
• Black and Latino defendants are disadvantaged compared to 
white people with regard to legal-process related factors such as 
the “trial penalty,” sentence reductions for substantial assistance, 
criminal history, pretrial detention, and type of attorney; 
 
• Black defendants convicted of harming white victims suffer 
harsher penalties than black people who commit crimes against 
other black people or white defendants who harm white people; 
 
• Black and Latino defendants tend to be sentenced more severely 
than comparably situated white defendants for less serious 
crimes, especially drug and property crimes. 
 
Studies that examine death-penalty cases have generally found that: 
 
• In the vast majority of cases, if the murder victim is white, the 
defendant is more likely to receive a death sentence; 
 
• In a few jurisdictions, notably the federal system, minority 
defendants (especially black people) are more likely to receive a 
death sentence.129 
 
The 1930s incarceration rate of U.S. black people was 3:1130; in 
2010 it was 6.7 times that of white people;131  Disproportionate 
imprisonment is found in many multi-ethnic liberal democracies: 
Table 1: Ethnic Majority/Minority Incarceration Rate Ratios 
Jurisdiction Comparison Ratio 
UK132 Black/white 5:1 
Canada133 Aboriginal/white; black/white 7.8:1; 3:1 
                                                
129 Tushar Kansal, The Sentencing Project, Racial Disparity in Sentencing: A Review of the 
Literature 2 (Marc Mauer ed., 2005). 
130 Harris, supra note 111. 
131 Paul Guerino et al., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Prisoners in 2010, 7 (2011), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf. 
132 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System, 2007/8: A 
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE PUBLICATION UNDER SECTION 95 OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1991 
171 (U.K.) (2009) (estimating that the black/white ratio of stop and searches is 8:1). 
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Australia134 Aboriginal/white 13:1 
S. Africa135 Black/white; colored white 5.7:1; 11:1 
Taiwan136 Aborigine/Han 6:1 
New Zealand137 Maori/non-Maori 6:1 
Greece138 Roma/non-Roma 7:1 
 
In comparison, the late 1990s rate for Tibet Autonomous 
Region ethnic Tibetans was 70% that of the all-China incarceration 
rate and only one eightieth the African American rate.  For Tibetans 
in neighboring Qinghai province, the incarceration rate was only a 
seventh to an eighth of the all-China rate and a mere one four-
hundredth of the African American rate.139 
                                                                                                           
133  PRISON DAY JUSTICE CTR., Behind the Bars in Canada (2008), available at 
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and Crime Not Exactly a Black and White Matter, VANCOUVER SUN, Mar. 25, 2006, at C5 
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Qimin, Dui shaoshu minzu zhong de fanzui fenzi bixu shixing ‘liang shao yi kuan’ zhengce 
(The policy of two restraints and one leniency must be practiced among ethnic minority 
criminal elements). QINGHAI MINZU XUEYUAN XUEBAO SHEHUI KEXUE BAN 1, 1991, 
available at http://bbs.m4.cn/thread-183351-1-1.html; Zhang Qimin, Liang shao yi kuan 
shi zenme hui shi? (How did two restraints and one leniency come to be?), Jun. 30, 2009, 
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HIERARCHY 62, 77 (Jae Ho Chung & Lam Tao-Chiu eds., 2010).   
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      The past few decades of large increases in imprisonment of 
young African American men may mean that many claims of black 
progress are misleading because statistics on employment and high 
school graduation are based on household surveys that do not 
include people behind bars.  For example, a 2012 study showed that, 
“including inmates in assessments of high school completion 
indicates no improvement in the black-white gap in high school 
graduation rates among men since the early 1990s.”140  
When identically-qualified U.S. black and white “testers” 
were used to study housing discrimination, black people who 
expressed interest in a loan, home viewing, or realtor services were 
discriminated against half the time as renters and 59% as buyers.141 
The U.S. government has implemented programs that foster 
residential segregation and fail to adequately respond to housing 
discrimination.142 Residential segregation of African Americans has 
declined only slightly in the past two decades; most black people are 
still severely segregated from white people and in many large 
metropolises, the dissimilarity index (no segregation = 0; complete 
segregation = 1) exceeds 0.7.  Latino and Asian American 
residential segregation from other “races” has increased or at least 
remained at the level of 30 years earlier, while the U.S. now has 
intense Latino and Asian American ethnic enclaves in many parts of 
the country.143  As a result in part of segregation, two-thirds of 
African-American children born between 1985 and 2000 are being 
raised in high poverty neighborhoods, as against 6% of white 
children.144  
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REV.SOC. 167-203 (2003); George P. Mason et al., Residential Segregation and 
Desegregation: is Housing Discrimination a Relevant Sociological Issue in the 21st 
Century? paper, AM. SOC. ASS’N  MEETING, Aug. 10, 2006; John R. Logan & Brian J. Stults, 
The Persistence of Segregation in the Metropolis: New Findings from the 2010 Census 
(2011), available at http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Data/Report/report2.pdf; see also 
Steven Holloway et al, The Racially Fragmented City: Neighbourhood Racial Segregation 
and Diversity Jointly Considered, in 64.1 PROFESSIONAL GEOGRAPHER 63 (2011).  
144  Economic Mobility for African Americans May be a Myth, Pew Reports Shows, 
HUFFPOST BLACK VOICES, July 17, 2012, 
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U.S. schools are more segregated now than in earlier 
decades, in part because in 1970, four-fifths of white students were 
in public schools, but in 2012, less than half were.145  Some 80% of 
Latino and 74% of African American students were in schools 
where most students are not white; while 43% of Latinos and 38% 
of black people attend "intensely segregated schools," where white 
people are 10% or less.146  Most black students are now in schools 
where almost two-thirds of students are low-income, nearly double 
the level in schools of most white or Asian American students.147  
Re-segregation of U.S. schools partly results from government 
policy: 
The Obama Administration, like the Bush 
Administration, has taken no significant action to 
increase school integration or to help stabilize 
diverse schools as racial change occurs in urban and 
suburban housing markets and schools. Small 
positive steps in civil rights enforcement have been 
undermined by the Obama Administration’s strong 
pressure on states to expand charter [publicly-
funded, but privately-operating] schools, the most 
segregated sector of schools for black students.148 
 
Black and Latino student performance has also declined to 
the level at the beginning of the 1980s, with high school seniors (17 
years old) performing at the level of 13-year old white people.  The 
gap is widening in math and other subjects.  The main reasons are a 
growing inequality in the resources provided schools and 
“unconscious bias.”149 A 2012 report showed that 52% of black 
males, 58% of Latino males, but 78% of white males graduate high 
school.  That represents a very small narrowing of the gap between 
white people and black people (26%) from what it was ten years 
                                                                                                           
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/17/economic-mobility-african-
americans_n_1676811.html, 
145 Gary Orfield, John Kucsera & Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, E Pluribus…Separation: 




146 Id. at 7. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 9. 
149 Black, Latino Students Perform at Levels of 30 Years Ago, HUFFPOST EDUCATION, Jan. 
23, 2012, www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/23/black-latino-students-per_n_1224790.html. 
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earlier (29%), but only, as mentioned above, if incarcerated black 
people are ignored in calculating graduation rates.  In states where 
black populations are small (Idaho, Maine, Utah, Vermont), black 
males do about as well or better than white males, because there 
they are not relegated to under-resourced education.  International 
experience (Canada’s Ontario province, Finland, Singapore, etc.) 
shows that when developed countries want to rapidly raise high 
school graduation rates, they can, but the U.S. government has 
chosen to not do so.150 
In the past three decades, the number of black people with 
advanced degrees and producing growth in the share of minorities in 
bachelor’s degree programs.151  A large gap remains however: 40% 
of white people, but only 23% of African Americans and 25% of 
Latinos who turned 24 in 2009 had a bachelor’s degree or were 
studying for one.152  A 2011 report stated that black people with 
bachelor’s degrees on average earn 20% less than white people with 
these degrees; black people with professional degrees earn 23% less 
in lifetime earnings, while those with master’s degrees earn less 
than white people with bachelor’s degrees.153  The New York Times 
has said that it is “difficult not to attribute the wage gap to outright 
bias.”154   
   Affirmative action is far from compensating for bias.  A 
2009 study found that affirmative action barely exists in the U.S. 
and notes that 18 of the 50 U.S. states, including highly diverse 
California, “have on their books legislative enactments or 
constitutional amendments prohibiting race-based admissions, 
policies in public education and other government programs.”155 
Most higher education institutions have no preferential policies for 
minorities and thus calculations show that if all such programs 
                                                
150 “The Urgency of  Now: The Schott 50 State Report on Public Education and Black 
Males,” SCHOTT FOUNDATION, 2012, www.schottfoundation.org/publications-reports/.  
151  Stephen Carter, Affirmative Distraction, THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 6, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/06/opinion/06carter.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
152  Bureau of Labor Statistics, America’s Young Adults at 24, 2012, 
www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/nlsyth.pdf. 
153 Anthony Carnevale, Stephen Rose & Ban Cheah, The College Payoff: Education, 
Occupation, Lifetime Earnings, THE GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CENTER ON EDUCATION 
AND THE WORKFORCE, 11 (2011), http://cew.georgetown.edu/collegepayoff/. 
154 Mototko Rich, It’s not Just the Degree, but what you Study, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 
11, 2011, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/04/its-not-just-the-degree-but-what-
you-study/.  
155 John Johnson and Robert Green, Affirmative Action (Santa Barbara: ABC Clio, 2009): 
172-173. 
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ended, the chances of a white applicant’s admission would only rise 
by 1.2%.156  At U.S. law schools, affirmative action expands the pool 
of black students by only 14% and only a third of black students 
admitted under affirmative action succeed in becoming lawyers.157 
In U.S. society generally, white women are affirmative action’s 
main beneficiaries.158  Affirmative action in higher education may 
be further curtailed after a 2013 Fifth Circuit Court decision that 
requires judges to strictly scrutinize “inherently suspect” admissions 
programs that have race as a component and permit only those 
narrowly tailored to “further compelling government interests.”159  
However, this particular decision was later appealed and reversed. 
African Americans face discrimination in 20% of job 
interviews; employers are 16% more likely to give a job to a white 
person even when a black person applied first and was better 
qualified, and are four times more likely to ask black applicants 
about job absenteeism than to ask white people.160  White people get 
50% more call-backs than similarly-qualified African Americans; 
white people people’s higher-qualified resumes elicit 30% more 
call-backs than lower-qualified ones, but for black people, having 
higher qualifications makes no difference in terms of call-backs.161  
White people with criminal records actually get more call-backs 
than equally-qualified black people who have no criminal record.162  
From 1994 to 2004, complaints of racial discrimination filed at the 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) rose by 
125%.163  A 2012 study of five million private workplaces showed 
                                                
156 Tim Wise, Affirmative Action: Racial Preference in Black and White (New York: 
Routledge, 2005): 72; 
157 Richard Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools. 57 
STANFORD L. REV. 479 (2004).   
158 Ella Bell and Stella Nkomo, Our Separate Ways: Black and White Women and the 
Struggle for Professional Identity (New York: McGraw Hill, 2001).  
159 Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin et. al. 631 F.3d. 248 (5th. Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995) (quoting 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 
(1978)); Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin et. al., 631 F.3d. 218 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (S.Ct. 2003). 
160 Richard Schaefer, RACIAL AND ETHNIC GROUPS, (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 
10th ed., 2006). 
161 Marianne Bertrand and Senhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable 
than Lakisha and Jamal: a Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. 
ECON. REV. 992 (2004). 
162 Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC., 958 (2003). 
163  U.S. EEOC, Race/Color Discrimination: Statistics, 2008, 
www.eeoc.gov/types/race.html. 
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that the trend to greater racial equality in U.S. workplaces had 
halted by 1980 and that the biggest gainers in managerial positions 
have been white men.  Employment segregation of U.S. workplaces 
is high and, in one-sixth of U.S. industries, mainly those with high 
wages, racial segregation of white and black men is in fact 
increasing.164 
 Increasing Ethnic Inequality in Income and Wealth 
In recent decades, average black incomes have fallen relative 
to white incomes: they were 34% of white incomes in 1880, 47% in 
1947, 60% in 1971, 63% in 1974, 58% in 2010, and 55% in 2012.165  
Moreover, “the median annual household income for black people 
declined by 11.1% (from $36,567 to $32,498) from June 2009 to 
June 2012.”166  The decline for white people was 5.2% and for 
Latinos 4.1%,167 but over the longer term and in many respects, there 
is a decline among Latinos as well.  Princeton University sociologist 
Douglas Massey, who studies the Latino population, remarked in 
2012 that “over the past 20 years they have fallen on almost every 
measure of social and economic well-being . . . .”168  
Contrary to “American Dream” scenarios, children from 
low-income backgrounds have little opportunity to strike it rich; 
they have a 1% chance to make it to the top 5% of income earners, 
whereas children of the rich have a 22% chance.  Black children 
born in the bottom quartile of income distribution are nearly twice 
as likely to remain there as adults than white children with parents 
having identical incomes.  Because differences in mobility for 
African Americans and white people persist, even after taking into 
account many parental background factors and children’s education 
and health, race per se remains an important determinant of 
economic mobility.169  Black people born into the middle class have 
                                                
164 Kevin Stainback and Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Documenting Desegregation: Racial 
and Gender Segregation in Private Sector Employment Since the Civil Rights Act (2012). 
165 Catherine Rampell, Big Income Losses for those Near Retirement, THE NEW YORK 




168 Parry, supra note 108.  See generally Scot Gray, Back at the Lunch Counter Again? 
INSIGHTNEWS.COM (Apr. 3, 2012), http://insightnews.com/lifestyle/8741-back-at-lunch-
counter-again. 
169 Tom Hertz, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, UNDERSTANDING MOBILITY IN AMERICA 
(2006). 
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a much higher chance (50%) of downward income mobility than 
middle-class-born white people (16%).  African Americans born 
into poor families (lowest quintile income) have a higher chance 
(54%) of staying poor than white people born into a poor family 
(31%).170 In 2000, black people reached the 1991 white high school 
completion rate and 1977 white college completion rate, but their 
incomes averaged only those of white families in 1963.  Only a third 
of the more than 20% gap in wages between black and white men 
can be explained by the sum of factors other than race 
discrimination.171 
 Black people have much less wealth than white people and 
their position declined from the mid-1990s to mid-2000s and then 
declined further in the mid-to-late 2000s as the recession held sway: 
From 2005 to 2009, inflation-adjusted median wealth 
fell by 66% among Latino households and 53% 
among black households, compared with just 16% 
among white households.  As a result of these 
declines, the typical black household had just $5,677 
in wealth (assets minus debts) in 2009; the typical 
Latino household had $6,325 in wealth; and the 
typical white household had $113,149. Moreover, 
about a third of black (35%) and Latino (31%) 
households had zero or negative net worth in 2009, 
compared with 15% of white households. 
 
Thus in 2009, white wealth was on average 20 times African 
American wealth; the white-to-Latino wealth ratio was 15:1.  In 
1995, the differences in both cases had been seven times.  About a 
quarter of all Latino (24%) and black (24%) households in 2009 had 
no assets other than a vehicle, compared with just 6% of white 
households172 
                                                
170 Julia Issacs, ECONOMIC MOBILITY PROJECT, ECONOMIC MOBILITY OF BLACK AND WHITE 
FAMILIES (2007); Kenneth Ng & Nancy Virts, The Black-White Income Gap in 1880, 61:1 
AGRICULTURAL HISTORY 1(1993); Distribution of Household Income by Race, INFOPLEASE 
(2012), www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0104552.html(identifying that  Latino family income in 
2007 was 62% that of white people, down from 63% in 2001); APPLIED RESEARCH CENTER 
AND CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, CHECK THE COLOR LINE: 2009 INCOME 
REPORT, available at 
www.racewire.org/archives/2009/02/report_racial_income_gap_chron.html. 
171 William Spriggs, The  Economic Crisis in Black and White, AMERICAN PROSPECT 
(September 19, 2008), http://prospect.org/article/economic-crisis-black-and-white.  
172 Rakesh Kochhar et al., Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs Between Whites, Blacks and 
Hispanics, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, (July 26, 2011), available at 
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     Some 80% of black people start adulthood with no wealth 
and no access to it through relatives.173  A 2012 report found that 
68% of African Americans reared in middle quintile households fall 
into the bottom two quintiles, compared to 31% for white people.174  
Compared to white people, black people continue to be bereft of 
important assets.  Of the 932 million acres of agricultural land in the 
U.S. in 1999, 98.1% was owned by white people and only 0.9% by 
black people.175  Only 18% of black people and Latino people, but 
43% of white people, have retirement savings accounts.176  Much of 
African American wealth loss in the recession was because 60% of 
black peoples’ wealth was in home ownership.  Banks had 
disproportionately steered black and Latino people into buying high 
interest sub-prime mortgages: members of these minorities with 
good credit ratings received sub-primes at three times the rate of 
white people with equal credit ratings.  The result is that about a 
fourth of African American homeowners are likely to have lost their 
homes in the crisis.177 
U.S. ethnic policies have not created harmonious “race 
relations.”  Black people in 2010 were 13% of Americans, but 70% 
of racial hate crimes victims, while white people, were 72.4% of the 
U.S. population, but 17% of victims.178 Almost all minority people 
see white people as economic and political competitors; white 
people are so advantaged they do not see minorities as 
competitors.179 
                                                                                                           
www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/07/26/wealth-gaps-rise-to-record-highs-between-whites-
blacks-Latinos/. 
173  Melvin L. Oliver & Thomas M. Shapiro, Black Wealth, White Wealth: A New 
Perspective on Racial Inequality (1997). 
174  PEW CHARITABLE TRUST & ECONOMIC MOBILITY PROJECT, Pursuing the American 
Dream: Economic Mobility Across Generations 3 (July 2012), available at 
http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Asset/2012/Pursuing_American_Dream.pdf. 
175  Jess Gilbert et al., Who Owns the Land? Agricultural Land Ownership by 
Race/Ethnicity, 17:4 RURAL AMERICA 55, 56 (2002). 
176 Barbara Ehrenreich & Dedrick Muhammad, Op-Ed., The Recession’s Racial Divide, 
THE NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, available at 
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177 Debbie Gruenstein Bocian et. al., CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, Lost Ground, 
2011: Disparities in Mortgage Lending and Foreclosures.  See also Emily Badger, Were 
Banks Guilty of Racial Discrimination in the Housing Crisis?, THE ATLANTIC CITIES, Oct. 
16, 2012, available at www.theatlanticcities.com/housing/2012/10/did-big-banks-
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178  Federal Bureau of Investigations, Hate Crime Statistics 2010, www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-victims.   
179  Vincent Hutchings et al., Whose Side Are You On? Explaining Perceptions of 
Competitive Threat in a Multi-Racial and Multi -Ethnic National Sample  (Aug. 31, 2006). 
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  After uprisings in scores of U.S. cities from 1964-1968, a 
safety valve was supposed to have opened through opportunities for 
ethnic minorities to join elites; yet, in Miami in 1980 and Los 
Angeles in 1992 there were major uprisings, while smaller ones 
occurred in many other U.S. cities.180  A systematic study of such 
events has concluded that more are likely, albeit in forms different 
from the earlier ones.181  Meanwhile, affirmative action has hardly 
affected the ethnic profile of the top rungs of firms that dominate 
the U.S. economy: in 2005, 98% of CEOs of Fortune 500 
companies and 95% of their top earners were white males.182 
Contrary to common assumption, the U.S. government does 
not have a vigorous program to promote ethnic equality and 
President Obama years has been exceptionally quiescent about 
ethnic inequality.  University of Pennsylvania scholar Daniel Gillion 
examined Public Papers of the Presidents and determined that in his 
first two years in office, President Obama had spoken less about 
race than any Democratic President since 1961. 183   President 
Obama’s 2011 State of the Union message was the first such speech 
since 1948 to not mention either poverty or the poor.184 
If there has been little “Black progress” in the U.S. and 
significant evidence of deterioration in the material position of 
African-Americans, there has also been an increase in white racial 
prejudice against Black people during the tenure of the U.S.’s first 
African American president.  In a 2012 random sample survey of 
Americans conducted for Associated Press (AP) by university 
researchers, 51% expressed explicit anti-black attitudes, up from 
48% in 2008, while 56% had implicit anti-black attitudes, up from 
49% in 2008.  In a 2011 AP survey, 52% of non-Latino white 
people expressed anti-Latino attitudes and 57% did so implicitly.185 
 
 
                                                
180  Los Angeles Engulfed in Riots, HISTORY.COM, Apr. 29, 1992, 
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184 Harris, supra not 111. 
185 Sonya Ross & Jennifer Agiesta, Racial Views: Poll Shows Majority Harbor Prejudice 
against Blacks, HUFFPOST (Oct. 27, 2012), 
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 Indigenous and Colonized U.S. Minorities      
  The rights of Native Americans (“American Indians”), the 
only Americans who have been endowed by law with 
comprehensive minority group rights, are now under assault from 
those who want to end all government-sponsored ethnic preferences.  
Opponents of affirmative action seek to gut the body of “Indian law” 
that singles out for special treatment tribal Indians living on or near 
reservations.186  Scaled-back rights would adversely impact this 
indigenous minority, whose income level is only two-thirds that of 
white people, whose college enrollment rate is only 42% of white 
people, who have a 25% poverty rate, a 40% unemployment rate, 
and a suicide rate more than twice the national average.187  In the 
plains states, where Native Americans are concentrated, they have a 
very high incarceration rate compared to the averages in those 
states.188 
 
Table 2: Percent Native Americans (NA) in Plains States 
Populations and Imprisoned There 
 
                                                
186 Carole Goldberg, American Indians and “Preferential” Treatment, 49 UCLA L. REV. 
943 (2002). 
187 Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005 (2006), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p60-231.pdf; Graduate Management Admissions 
Council, Key Statistics: American Indians and Alaska Natives (Sept. 2011), 
http://www.gmac.com/NR/rdonlyres/3B683F19-18D9-4620-A73A-
96F9CF0FF19E/0/HO_NativeAmericanIndiansData.pdf; Laurel Morales, Native 
Americans Have the Highest Suicide Rate, FRONTERAS, Aug. 31, 2012, available at 
www.fronterasdesk.org/news/2012/aug/31/native-americans-have-highest-rate-suicide/  
(identifying that some 45% of self-declared American Indians are of mixed ancestry, and 
the social conditions of “full blooded Indians,” especially on reservations, are significantly 
worse).  
188 See Greg Guma, Native Incarceration Rates are Increasing, TOWARDSFREEDOM.COM 
(May 27, 2005), www.towardfreedom.com/americas/140-native-incarceration-rates-are-
increasing-0302 (stating that 709 per 100,000 American Indians were incarcerated in U.S. 
prisons in 2000 as opposed to African Americans, whose rate hit 1815 per 100,000); Lisa 
Desjardins & Emma Lacey-Bordeaux, Problems of Liberty and Justice of the Plains, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/10/us/embed-america-tribal-justice/ (last updated Dec. 13, 
2012) (discussing the alarming rates of incarceration among American Natives, particularly 
in South Dakota); The Role of the SBA 8(a) Program in Enhancing Economic Development 
in Indian Country: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 116th Cong. (2011) 
(statement of Lance Morgan, Chairman Native Am. Contractors Ass’n) 
2014] U.S./INDIA MODEL FOR CHINA’S ETHNIC POLICIES          127 
 
State % NA Pop. NA % Prison Pop. 
South Dakota 8.9 29 
North Dakota 5 19 
Nebraska 1 5 
Wyoming 2 7 
Montana 7 19 male; 33 female 
Minnesota 1.3 9 
 
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights attributes such disparities to 
differential treatment by the criminal justice system, lack of access 
to adequate counsel, and racial profiling.189 
 Native Hawaiians have even worse conditions than Native 
Americans.  Between first contact with Europeans in 1778 and the 
U.S. annexation of 1900, the native Hawaiian population decreased 
by about 95%, mainly through the introduction of diseases.190  In the 
subsequent century, the native population partially recovered, but 
largely due to intermarriage, which spread out the potential to claim 
Native Hawaiian status, so that full Native Hawaiians are now less 
than 5% of the native population.191  Native Hawaiians are, by 
official reckoning, 20% of the state’s population; but they account 
for 75% of Hawaii’s annual deaths among persons less than 18 
years of age.192  While in the last three decades, rates of death from 
diseases have decreased for the state’s non-indigenous people, they 
have increased significantly for Native Hawaiians. 193   The life 
expectancy of Native Hawaiians is about 10.5 years less than the 
statewide average and around the level of poor Latin American 
countries.194 
   Hawaiian poverty and incarceration rates are twice the 
statewide average.  The higher the level of education, the lower the 
participation of Hawaiians: they are 25% of elementary and 
secondary students, but 16% of community college students, 9% of 
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http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/native-americans-and-death-penalty#criminal (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2014). 
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University of Hawaii main campus students and only one out of 
every 200 students awarded MA, PhD, law, and medicine degrees.195  
Yet, “the university and the state legislature refuse to fund request 
for tuition waivers and other educational aid specifically targeted for 
Hawaiians.”196  Adult Native Hawaiians have an arrest rate that 
equals their proportion of the population (20%) and a lower rate still 
for violent crimes, but an incarceration rate that is twice the state 
average; so that they make up 40% of the state’s inmates.197  Native 
Hawaiian juveniles have an arrest rate equal to their proportion in 
the population, but are 50% of incarcerated juveniles.  State 
authorities largely blame Native Hawaiians themselves for these 
conditions, ignoring the routine discrimination that they face.198 
Indigenous Alaskans (Inuit or “Eskimos” and Natives, e.g. 
Athabaskans, Aleuts, etc.) are 16% of the state’s population and 
have conditions very like those of Native Hawaiians.199  They earn 
on average less than half white Alaskans’ incomes per capita and 
have much greater educational failure, health problems, poverty, 
language loss, alcoholism and violence than other Alaskans. 200  
Their rates for these disabilities are some of the highest in the U.S.  
The overall unemployment rates for indigenous Alaskans have been 
pegged at 27.3% (men) and 16% (women).  The poverty rate for 
Alaskan native has been put at 27.5%, versus 9.8% for all Alaskans.  
Alaska Natives’ rate of incarceration exceeds 250% of their 
numbers in the state’s general population.201  Their suicide rate is 
twice that of the state’s non-natives.202           
The U.S. government treats one group of U.S. minority 
citizens as second-class in law.  Puerto Ricans living in their large 
island U.S. territory “plainly possess fewer political rights than their 
                                                
195 Id.; U.S. Census Bureau Facts for Features: Asian Pacific Heritage Month (Apr. 29, 
2011), 
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_editions/c
b11-ff06.html (some 14% of Native Hawaiians have bachelor’s degrees; 4% have 




199 Inuit and Alaska Natives, WORLD DIRECTORY OF MINORITIES, 
www.minorityrights.org/?lid=2617&tmpl=printpage (last updated Apr. 2009). 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202  Mark Thiessen, Alaska Native Suicide Rate More Than Twice That of Natives, 
ADN.COM (Jul. 30, 2012), http://www.adn.com/2012/07/30/2563810/native-suicide-rate-
in-alaska.html. 
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counterparts in the fifty states.  They are subject to various forms of 
external tutelage (both legislative and judicial) on which they have 
weak voice and no vote.”203  Some scholars have thus regarded 
Puerto Rico as a colony.204  In contrast, while political rights in 
China are constrained, second-class citizenship is not inscribed in 
law for any minority area; in fact, China’s minority areas have some 
rights beyond those of non-minority areas (see below).  Puerto Rico 
has a 45% poverty rate, three times the U.S. national average and 
83% of Puerto Rican children live in high poverty areas, versus 11% 
of U.S. mainland children.205 
 Mistrust and Separatism 
The large and growing disparities between white people and 
most U.S. ethnic minorities reflect that there is, in effect, no U.S. 
government initiative to specifically better the lot of minorities.  The 
remains of affirmative action and inclusion of minority politicians 
are virtually the limit of U.S. ethnic policies.206  These policies 
however are not mainly fruits of the labors of U.S. political elites, 
who have mostly resisted them, but products of the 1960s and 1970s 
civil rights movement.  Since then, it has largely been social 
                                                
203 Laurence Whitehead, Two-Tier Citizenship: The Unresolved Challenge of Puerto Rico’s 
Electoral Exclusion, DEMOCRATIZATION IN AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL 
ANALYSIS 56, 67 (Desmond King et al. eds., 2009). 
204  See e.g., Pedro A. Malavet, AMERICA’S COLONY: THE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL 
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PUERTO RICO (Richard Delgado & Jean 
Stefancic eds., 2004). (The lack of fully equal rights for Puerto Ricans is the basis for 
terming it a colony.  Both Puerto Rican pro-independence and pro-statehood parties regard 
Puerto Rico as a colony.); Davin A. Rezvani, The Basis of Puerto Rico’s Constitutional 
Status: Colony, Compact, or “Federacy”?, 122 POL. SCI. Q. 115, 117 (2007). 
205 Dania Alexandrino, Study: Puerto Rico’s Children Mired in Poverty that Dwarfs Rest of 
U.S., CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/01/us/puerto-rico-child-poverty/ (last updated 
Aug. 1, 2012). 
206  See Jennifer E. Manning, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEMBERSHIP OF THE 112TH 
CONGRESS: A PROFILE (Nov. 26, 2012), available at 
http://www.senate.gov/CRSReports/crs-publish.cfm?pid=%260BL(Q%2CK%3C%0A 
(The U.S. is not distinguished by a high proportion of minority political leaders.  In 2012, 
16% of the 539 U.S. Congress members were minorities: 8% African Americans, 5.7% 
Latinos, 2.2% Asian Americans, .2% Native American. Meanwhile, minorities were about 
34% of the U.S. population); United States Demographics Profile 2013, INDEXMUNDI.COM, 
http://www.indexmundi.com/united_states/demographics_profile.html (last viewed Feb. 2, 
2014); List of Members of the 18th CPC Central Committee, XINHUANET.COM (Nov. 14, 
2011), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/14/c_131974817.htm 
(Of 376 Chinese Communist Party 18th Central Committee members elected in November, 
2012, 38 or 10.1% were minorities, while minorities were about 8.5% of China’s 
population).        
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movements and not state policies that have deployed to counteract 
deterioration in minorities’ social position.  These efforts have 
largely been unsuccessful, in part because many Americans despise 
politicians,207 but cling to electoral politics as the sine qua non for 
redressing inequity.208  Yet, political mistrust is much higher among 
African Americans than among white people and has a different 
character: white people’ mistrust tends to be based on discontent 
with government performance, while black people’s mistrust is 
more a function of unhappiness with the political system itself.209 
The absence of policies to close the ethnic gaps in every 
aspect of U.S. life contributes to disproportionate support for 
separatism and a lesser degree of U.S. nationalism among black and 
Latino minorities.  In a 2008 poll, 22% of Americans supported a 
right to secession for their state or region, but 43% of Latinos and 
40% of black people did so, while 18% of Americans, but 33% of 
African Americans, say they would support a secessionist 
movement.  The strongest support for a right to secession (40%) and 
for secessionist movements (25%) was among 18-24 year olds and 
such support was stronger among liberals than conservatives.210  A 
2012 poll for Rasmussen Reports found that 24% of Americans 
“believe states that should be able to withdraw from the United 
                                                
207 Frank Newport, Congress Retains Low Honesty Rating, GALLUP.COM (Dec. 3, 2012), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/159035/congress-retains-low-honesty-rating.aspx (A 2012 
random sample of U.S. adults rating those in 22 fields on honesty and ethical conduct put 
members of Congress at the bottom, lower than car salespeople.); Jeffrey M. Jones, 
Congress’ Approval Rating Remains Near Historical Lows, GALLUP.COM (Aug. 13, 2013), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/163964/congress-approval-rating-remains-near-historical-
lows.aspx. 
208 Deva Woodly, Black Youth Book Project: Political Efficacy Literature Review, BLACK 
YOUTH PROJECT RESEARCH, available at 
http://research.blackyouthproject.com/survey/topics/political-efficacy/ (That does not seem 
to be the case for African-American youth, however. Studies show that “understanding the 
political situation actually decreases the level of trust in African American youth.”) 
209 James M. Avery, Political Mistrust Among African Americans and Support for the 
Political System, 62 POL. RES. Q. 132 (2009); James P. Wenzel, Acculturation Effects on 
Trust in National and Local Government Among Mexican Americans, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. 1073 
(2006) (Latino political mistrust of the U.S. government increases with acculturation.); 
Katherine Tate, Black Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and their Representatives in 
the U.S. Congress 47 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003) (Some 60% of African 
Americans favor altering electoral rules to guarantee black people and Latinos are 
represented in Congress in their proportions of the U.S. population). 
210  One in Five Americans Believe States Have the Right to Secede, MIDDLEBURY 
INSTITUTE (July 23, 2008), http://middleburyinstitute.org/zogbysecessionpoll2008.html. 
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States to form their own country, if they want” and 51% said that 
the U.S. federal government presents a “danger to liberty.” 211 
After the Texas governor hinted in 2009 that Texas might 
secede if Texans found the federal government’s policies not to 
their liking, 31% of polled Texans believed Texas has a right to 
secede,212 despite a post-Civil War U.S. Supreme Court ruling that 
held that no state has that right.213  Some 35% of surveyed Texans 
and 48% who identify with the Republican Party agreed Texas 
would do better if independent; 61% of all Texans and 48% of 
Republicans disagreed.214  After President Obama’s re-election in 
2012, a petition endorsing Texas independence garnered 116,000 
signatures in one week 215  and 20% of Texans (35% of Texas 
Republicans) indicated they would support Texas seceding because 
of President Obama’s election victory. 216   Nationally, 18% of 
American adults and 25% of Republicans voiced the same 
position.217 
                                                
211  Liz Harrington, American Support for Secession Increases 10% in Just 2 Years, 
CNSNEWS.COM (June 6, 2012), www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2892159/posts.  
Secessionists in the U.S. have advanced an intellectual basis for their ideas through a book 
edited by Emory University political philosopher Donald Livingston, Rethinking the 
American Union for the 21st Century (Gretna: Pelican Pub, 2011).   
212 Perry’s Hint of Secession May be Aimed at Primary, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, 
April 19, 2009, at 3B. 
213 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1869).  Justice Antonin Scalia, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
most conservative member, wrote in 2006 that, “If there was any constitutional issue 
resolved by the Civil War, it is that there is no right to secede.”  Abby Rogers, Sorry 
Secessionists, Justice Scalia Won’t Help You Out, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 15, 2012), 
www.businessinsider.com/justice-scalias-views-on-secession-2012-11. 
214 Alex Koppelman, Half of Texas Republicans Favor Secession, SALON.COM (Apr. 23, 
2009), http://www.salon.com/2009/04/23/texas_secession/.  In Canada, besides Quebecois, 
many westerners are separatists: 36% of Western Canadians (Alberta 42%, Saskatchewan 
32%, British Columbia 31% Manitoba 27%) have said they are willing to consider Western 
Canada becoming independent.  Kevin Steel, A Nation Torn Apart, WESTERN STANDARD 
(Aug. 22, 2005), http://www.westernstandard.ca/website/article.php?id=928. 
215 Manny Fernandez, With Stickers, a Petition and Even a Middle Name, Secession Fever 
Hits Texas, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 23, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/24/us/politics/with-stickers-a-petition-and-even-a-
middle-name-secession-fever-hits-texas.html?_r=0. 
216  Clinton Could Win Texas in 2016, PUBLIC POLICY POLLING (Jan. 31, 2013), 
www.publicpolicypolling.com/pdf/2011/PPP_Release_TX_013113.pdf. 
217 A Quarter of Republicans Want to Secede, Half Think Election Stolen, PUBLIC POLICY 
POLLING (Dec. 4, 2012), www.publicpolicypolling.com/main/2012/12/a-quarter-of-
republicans-want-to-secede-half-think-election-stolen.html.  Support for secession was 
higher in certain regions.  For example, 42% of Republicans in the U.S. state of Georgia 
indicated support for it.  Jim Galloway, PPP survey: 42% of Ga. Republicans Would 
Secede…, POLITICAL INSIDER (Dec. 7, 2012), http://blogs.ajc.com/political-insider-jim-
galloway/2012/12/07/ppp-survey-42-of-ga-republicans-would-secede-nathan-deal-job-
approval-at-37/. 
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  A 2007 survey question on secession by Vermont drew 
support from 13% of respondents.218  The Alaska Independence 
Party has about 15,000 registered voters, while the two major 
parties have a combined total of 200,000.219  Secessionist ideas that 
have been advanced by some minority organizations since the 
1960s220 are not necessarily anathematized by mainstream black and 
Latino leaders.221   
Greater minority than white support for secession accords 
with a lower level of patriotism, a proxy for national identity in the 
hyper-nationalistic U.S..222  A 2005 Gallup poll reported that 80% of 
white people termed themselves “extremely patriotic” or “very 
patriotic,” but only 46% of non-white people did so; conversely, 
20% of white people said they are “somewhat patriotic” or “not 
especially patriotic,” while 53% of non-white people did so.223  In a 
2009 Pew survey, 61% of white people, but 35% of black people 
agreed they were “very patriotic.”224      
  While it seems unlikely U.S. secessionists will gain power, 
few expected a secessionist party to take power in part of Britain, as 
did the Scottish National Party in 2011, despite Scots and English 
                                                
218 Michele Schmidt, Awareness and Support for the Arts Thriving in Vermont, 1 CENTER 
FOR RURAL STUD., U. OF VT., 4 (2007). 
219  Malia Litman, Civil War in Alaska, MALIA LITMAN’S BLOG (Jun. 6 2012), 
http://malialitman.wordpress.com/2012/06/06/civil-war-in-alaska/. 
220 The Nation of Islam (“Black Muslims”) had sought an independent country out of five 
U.S. states.  Peter Kihss, In Return for Years of Slavery, Four or Five States, The NEW 
YORK TIMES, April 23, 1961, at 406.  Mecha, the largest Latino student organization, 
asserted that the U.S. Southwest is “Occupied Mexico,” an idea still advanced by the 
Mexica Movement, La Voz de Aztlan and others.  An Absolut Outrage, INVESTORS 
BUSINESS DAILY (Apr. 9, 2008), http://news.investors.com/040908-444918-an-absolut-
outrage.htm?ntt=absolut; Bridget Johnson, No Place in Debate for Separatist Voice, DAILY 
NEWS (LOS ANGELES) (Jun. 12, 2007), http://www.dailynews.com/opinion/20070612/no-
place-in-debate-for-separatist-voice.   
221 Alton Maddox, Jr., No Blacks in the U.S. Senate in 2009?, AMSTERDAM NEWS (NEW 
YORK) (Dec. 24, 2009), http://amsterdamnews.com/news/2011/apr/12/no-blacks-in-the-us-
senate-in-2009/. 
222 A measure of nationalism, in 35 countries in 2003 and China in 2008, with a scale of 1-
100, found China had the highest score (80) and the U.S. second highest (76). Tang 
Wenfang and Benjamin Darr, Chinese Nationalism and its Political and Social Origin, 21 J. 
OF CONTEMP. CHINA, 811, 816 (2012).   In studies among U.S. university students in 2002 
and 2004, “blacks expressed lower levels of all forms of national attachment,” including 
national identity. Leonie Huddy and Nadia Khatib, American Patriotism, National Identity 
and Political Involvement, 51 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 63, 71 (2007). 
223 Joseph Carroll, Post 9/11Patriotism Remains Steadfast: Nonwhites Least Likely to Feel 
Patriotic, 266-267, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 2005, July 19, 2005.  
224 Polls on Patriotism and Military Service, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, 2011, 
www.aei.org/publicopinion9 (last visited Feb. 6, 2014). 
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being joined in a United Kingdom for over three centuries and 
sharing language and religion.  Still less was it expected that 
Catalonia, a part of Spain for three centuries where in 2006 only 
13% of those polled favored independence, would see a two-thirds 
pro-independence majority in the local parliament in 2012. 225  
Although hugely advantaged economically, developed countries 
with substantial national minorities tend to have secessionist 
movements, as in Scotland, Catalonia and the Basque country in 
Spain, Flanders in Belgium, and Quebec in Canada, movements that 
may gain power.226  In short, liberal democracy, in India, the U.S. or 
elsewhere, does not guarantee national solidarity. 
 ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN 
CHINA 
 Disparities and Location 
Ethnic inequalities in China may be culture-related,227 but 
most mainly derive from socio-economic factors.  The gaps often 
discussed include employment, income and wealth, with it asked 
whether they result from discrimination.  There are substantial 
income differences: 
 
Table 3: Minorities’ Average Monthly Incomes as % of Han 
Incomes in 2005228 
Rural             Urban 
                                                
225 Miles Johnson and Julius Purcell, Catalans Consider Road to Independence, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (Nov. 22, 2012); Agence France-Presse, Catalonia Grows in Distance from Spain, 
SCMP (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1091391/catalonia-
grows-distance-spain. 
226 John Coakley, PATHWAYS FROM ETHNIC CONFLICT: INSTITUTIONAL REDESIGN IN DIVIDED 
SOCIETIES 2-3 (London: Routledge, 2010). 
227  Cai Le, et al., Multilevel Analysis of the Determinants of Pre-Hypertension and 
Hypertension in Rural Southwest China, 126 PUB. HEALTH REP. 420  (2011). (discussing 
higher blood pressure and hypertension among some minorities). Juliet Elu and Gregory 
Price, Does Ethnicity Matter for Access to Childhood and Adolescent Health Capital: 
Evidence from the Wage-Height Relationship in the 2006 China Health and Nutrition 
Survey, 4TH WORLD CONGRESS ON REMEDIES TO ETHNIC AND RACIAL INEQUALITIES, UNIV. 
OF MINNESOTA (Oct. 11-3, 2012), 
www.hhh.umn.edu/centers/rwc/conferences/fourth/pdf/GregoryPrice4thWorldCongressPap
er.pdf. 
228 Emily Hannum and Wang Meiyan, China: A Case Study in Rapid Poverty Reduction, in 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, POVERTY AND DEVELOPMENT 165 (Cambridge University Press, 
2012). 
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Man                    101 Man                      94 
Hui                     83 Hui                       96 
Zhuang               69 Zhuang                 72 
Miao                   66 Miao                     76 
Uygur                 61 Uygur                    82 
Other minorities 73 Other minorities    85 
 
A 2009 State Ethnic Affairs Commission (guojia minwei) study 
reportedly concluded that “minority farmers and herders now earn 
only 72% of the national average, versus 88% in 1980.  Urban city 
dwellers earn about 84% of the national average, versus 87% in 
1980.”229  Other scholars noted that among rural households, the 
ratio of minority to Han per capita household income stagnated at 
66.3% in 1988, 67.14% in 1995, and 65.73% in 2002.  But among 
urban households, the ratio increased from 92% in 1988 to over 
100% in 2002.  For urban dwellers, minority returns to education 
were higher than for Han in 1995, but almost identical in 2007, 
while the premium for SOE employment was higher for minorities 
than for Han.  From 1995 and 2007, the gap widened as to males 
and narrowed as to females, but almost none of the inter-temporal 
changes in earnings disparities can be attributed to difference in 
treatment of minorities in one period versus treatment of minorities 
in another period or to differences in the treatment of Han in one 
period versus treatment of Han in another period.  Instead, most of 
the changes can be attributed to changes in endowments. 
The widened gap for urban males by 2007, despite minority 
educational attainment almost equaling that of Han, might be 
explained by decreased availability of SOE employment.  The 
narrowed gaps for urban females likely results from preferential 
policies.230   
                                                
229 Ian Johnson, Beijing’s Ethnic Policy Faces Data Challenge, WALL STREET JOURNAL 
(Jul. 22, 2009), online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB124816735513967749.  The 2008 
percentages are not for minorities per se, but the ratios of the five ethnic autonomous areas 
(Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Guangxi) and three provinces with high 
minority concentration (Yunnan, Guizhou and Qinghai).  China Spends 5 Billion USD on 
Poverty Relief for Ethnic Minorities over Five Years, XH (Dec. 22, 2010), 
news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-12/22/c_13660255.htm.  
230 Ding Sai, et al., Inter-Temporal Changes in Ethnic Urban Earnings Disparities in 
China, 653-696, Li Shi, et al (eds), RISING INEQUALITY IN CHINA: CHALLENGE TO A 
HARMONIOUS SOCIETY (Cambridge University Press, 2013). Differences in treatment are 
“measured by the differential returns to education, job opportunities, household structures, 
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The origins and dimensions of ethnic disparities in China 
may however be determined more by location (regions, urbanity and 
topography)231 and minority customs and less by discrimination than 
is the case in, for example, in the U.S.  There, a prominent study 
found that human capital and region accounted for 55% of the 
black-white wage gap, occupation distribution accounted for 20%, 
and the 25% unaccounted for was at least in part likely to be 
attributable to discrimination.232  A scholar of ethnic disparities in 
China has remarked that 
Geography is important in patterns of ethnic 
advantage and disadvantage.  More urbanized 
ethnic minority groups and groups not concentrated 
in poor regions tend to experience smaller or no 
disadvantage compared with the Han population.  
More rural ethnic minority groups have less access 
to education and social safety nets – unemployment 
and pension insurance – than do the more urbanized 
Han, Hui, and Manchu.  School enrollment gaps are 
smaller in urban areas.  Health insurance quality is 
also tied to location . . . . Overall, Han-minority 
disparities across social welfare outcomes diminish 
sharply when geographic differences are taken into 
account, suggesting that many gaps that appear as 
cross-ethnic differences are due to differences in 
regional development.233 
                                                                                                           
firm types, or provincial labor markets.  The economic interpretation of these differential 
returns is that they can produce unequal treatment of otherwise identically situated 
workers.” Id. at 660. 
231 Hannum and Wang, supra 228 at 163. 
232  Eric Grodsky and Devah Pager, The Structure of Disadvantage: Individual and 
Occupational Determinants of the Black-White Wage Gap, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 542 (2001).  
For an overview of more recent studies, see Devah Pager and Hana Shepherd, The 
Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit and 
Consumer Markets, 34 ANN. REV. OF SOCIOL. 181-209 (2008).  Studies may substantially 
underestimate the effects of racial discrimination in the U.S. because of more recent 
findings concerning the over-reporting of earnings by African Americans males in surveys.   
Kim Chang Hwan and Christopher Tamobini, Do Survey Data Estimate Earnings 
Inequality Correctly? Measurement Errors Among Black and White Male Workers, 90 SOC. 
FORCES, 1157 (2012). 
233 Emily Hannum, Ethnic Disparities in China: Geography, Rurality and Socioeconomic 
Welfare, WORLD BANK, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES COUNTRY BRIEF NUMBER 3, 2011-2, 
siteresources.worldbank.org/.../Resources/.../China-brief-0928.pdf.  See also Emily C. 
Hannum & Meiyan Wang, Ethnicity, Socioeconomic Status and Social Welfare in China 
23 (Asia-Pacific Education, Language Minorities and Migration (ELMM) Network 
Working Paper Series 2010), available at http://repository.upenn.edu/elmm/2. 






China’s ethnic minorities are highly concentrated regionally: 
Table 4: % Ethnic Minorities and Autonomous Counties by Region: 
234 
Population Counties 
Western 71.6 Western 91.6 
Central   16 Central  5.1 
Eastern   12.4 Eastern  3.2 
 
In the large-scale 2002 Chinese Household Income Project survey, 
in which 11% of the sample was ethnic minorities, 85% of 
“disadvantaged minorities” were found in the western region, while 
Han were even spread throughout the country.235  
China’s ethnic minorities are disproportionately rural: a few, 
such as Man and Hui, are at least as urban as Han, but in 2005, 45% 
of Han, but only 20% of Uygurs, 17% of Miao, 29% of Zhuang, and 
23% of other minorities were urban.236  In Xinjiang in 2000, Han 
were 54% urban, minorities were 24% and Uygurs 19%.237  A study 
found that in China in 2011, urban earned incomes were 5.2 times 
higher and urban disposable incomes 3.3 times higher than rural 
earned and disposable incomes.  The urban/rural wealth divide grew 
26% from 1997 to 2011 and 68% from 1985 to 2011.238  Also, 
“minorities are more likely to live in more isolated, remote villages 
with difficult topography and poor infrastructure”: a 2002 survey 
found that 38-44% of minority villages were in mountainous 
areas.239  China’s minorities are highly concentrated geographically.  
As of 2005, 
[T]he degree of ethnic clustering (density) is still 
remarkable.  In all, 73% of Mongols in China find 
                                                
234 Cherng et al., supra note 12, at 3. 
235  CARLOS GRADIN, RURAL POVERTY AND ETHNICITY IN CHINA, 3, 8, 9 (2013), 
www.ecineq.org/ecineq_bari13/FILESxBari13/CR2/p156.pdf. 
236 Hannum & Wang, supra note 228, at 165.  
237 Cao Huhua, Urban-Rural Income Disparity and Urbanization: What is the Role of 
Spatial Distribution of Ethnic Groups? A Case Study of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region in Western China, 44:8 REGIONAL STUDIES, 965, 977 (2010). 
238 China Daily, Urban/Rural Income Gap Gets Bigger: Report, XINHUA (Aug. 14, 2012), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-08/14/c_131785215.html. 
239 Hannum & Wang, supra note 228, at 166. 
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their home in Inner Mongolia, and over 70% of 
Tibetans in China reside in Tibet and [a] 
neighboring prefecture in western Sichuan province.  
About 99% of Uyghurs populate Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region and 92% of the Zhuang 
population lives in the Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region.240 
 
    In contrast, such geographical distinctions scarcely apply to 
U.S. minorities.  They are significantly less regionally concentrated 
than Chinese minorities:  
 
Table 5: % of African American and Latino Populations in U.S. 
Regions, 2010241 
African American Latino 
South                  55 South                   36 
West                   10 West                    41 
Midwest             18 Midwest               9 
Northeast            17 Northeast             14 
 
     Regions of concentration for black people (the South) and 
Latinos (the West), are also much less behind the rest of the U.S. 
than China’s west is behind the rest of China.242  A 2012 study has 
found that in the U.S., the “differences in personal income are 
actually quite small between regions.  If we account for . . . 
education and age, the differences shrink further.  We also find little 
                                                
240 Jia Wenshan, Ethno-Political Conflicts in China: Toward Building Interethnic Harmony, 
in HANDBOOK OF ETHNIC CONFLICT 177, 184 (Dan Landis & Rosita Albert eds., 2012). 
241  U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 CENSUS SHOWS BLACK POPULATION HAS HIGHEST 
CONCENTRATION IN THE SOUTH (Sept. 29, 2011), 
http://2010.census.gov/news/releases/operations/cb11-cn185.html. See also, Sharon R. 
Ennis et al., U.S. Census Bureau, THE LATINO POPULATION: 2010, in 2010 CENSUS BRIEFS 4 
(May 2011).  
242 See Anthony P. Carnevale & Nicole Smith, A Decade Behind: Breaking Out of the Low-
Skill Trap in the Southern Economy (Georgetown Public Policy Institute ed. 2012), 
http://www9.georgetown.edu/grad/gppi/hpi/cew/pdfs/DecadeBehind.Executive 
Summary.073112.pdf; See also Marc Parry, The Neighborhood Effect, THE CHRONICLE OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION, Nov. 5, 2012, http://www.chronicle.com/article/The-Neighborhood-
Effect/135492/ (stating that Black people and Latinos are disproportionately concentrated 
in poor neighborhoods, but location is not determinative of lower earnings or education 
because this factor has not changed where residents of such neighborhoods were given 
vouchers to move to low poverty neighborhoods). 
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evidence that gaps have increased over the past decade.”243  There is 
also a “low range of variation of poverty across regions in the 
United States” and “the effect of the higher concentration of Black 
people in the poorest states was statistically insignificant” in 
determining the poverty gap between black people and white 
people.244  The same was true of the geographical concentrations of 
Latinos, so that “The state or region where minorities live play no 
role in explaining their higher poverty rates.”245 
    Greater minority rurality in China is moreover the opposite 
of the U.S., where minorities were 37% of the population in 2012, 
but only 21% of the rural population in 2010. 246  Moreover 
“minorities are more likely to live in the largest metropolitan areas 
(more than 2.5 million inhabitants) than in non-metropolitan areas, 
which actually had the highest poverty rates.”247  The U.S. rural 
population is located differently from in China:  most is in exurbias, 
just outside urban areas.  Just 1.3% of U.S. farmers in 2007 were 
black and 2.5% were Latinos; only 45% of these minority farmers 
had farming as primary occupation.248  Among Chinese minorities in 
2005, 54% of Hui, 61% of Man, 76% of Zhuang, 82% of Miao and 
Uygurs and 79% of other minorities reported agriculture as their 
occupation.249  In contrast to China, U.S. mountain areas are not 
necessarily poor and they generally have few ethnic minorities.250 
                                                
243 See Nelson Oliver & Steven Whitaker, Regional Differences in Household Incomes, 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, (2012), 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/trends/2012/0512/01regeco.cfm. 
244 Gradin, supra note 235, at 3795. 
245 Id. 
246 Kenneth M. Johnson, Rural Demographic Change in the New Century: Slower Growth, 
Increased Diversity, CARSEY INSTITUTE (No. 44 5, 2012).  
247 Gradin, supra note 235, at 3795. 
248 Black Farmers , NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV. (NASS), U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC., 2007 CENSUS 
OF AGRIC. (2007), www.texassmallfarmersandrancherscbo.com/.../blackfactsheet.pdf; 
Latino Farmers NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV. (NASS), U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2007 CENSUS OF 
AGRIC. (2007), www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/Online.../Latino.pdf (stating 
that Black, Latino and Native American farmers have sued the U.S. Department of 
Agricultural for discrimination in the provision of loans and received significant 
settlements).  See also Latino Farmers Facing Financial Hardship Offered Lawsuit 
Financing by RD Legal Funding, LEGALFUNDING (Apr. 10, 2012), 
http://www.legalfunding.com/news/hispanic-farmers-facing-financial-hardship-offered-
lawsuit-financing-by-rd-legal-funding/. 
249 Hannum & Wang, supra note 228, at 175. 
250 Shelton Johnson, Why Do So Few African Americans Visit National Parks, ALTERNET, 
(Sept. 11, 2012), http://alternet.org/environment/why-do-so-few-african-americans-visit-
national-parks (describing how an African American Park Ranger in the mountainous 
Yosemite National Park has explained that the low visitation rates in U.S. national parks by 
black people are because “There are very few African Americans who have a childhood 
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Locational differences are central to ethnic disparities in 
poverty levels in China.251  As much as 35% of ethnic minority 
households are asserted to have incomes below the official poverty 
line.252  Yet, a study of rural poverty that “control[ed] for a number 
of household and location factors, [showed] no strong signs of 
household ethnicity having an independent effect on poverty 
status.”253  While 6.2% of minorities, but only 3.3% of Han had 
experienced one three-year spell of poverty, the difference 
disappeared as to shares of long-term poor among all poor 
households (20% for minority households; 23% for Han).254  A 
econometric study of rural poverty and ethnicity in China concluded 
that 
The incidence of poverty is larger among minorities 
because they tend to live in the least developed and 
mountainous areas that are being more slowly 
benefit[ed] from the strong country’s [sic] economic 
growth.  Poverty is higher among minorities also 
because they, especially in the western region, 
generally have more children, and less economic 
opportunities in a scenario where market forces 
increasingly determine incomes given their lower 
education and engagement in off-farm activities.255 
   
A study of the urban/rural income gap and urbanization in Xinjiang 
found that 
                                                                                                           
wilderness experience, an experience of mountains, deserts, forests, or grasslands.” This 
factor contrasts with Chinese minorities).  
251  Hannum & Wang, supra note 228, at 198 (regarding not only to Han/minority 
disparities, but also those among and within minority groups). 
252 See Xing Le, et al., 2012 CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMISTS,  Introduction and Impact of Preferential policies on Minority 
groups in China 9-10, 10-11 (Aug. 18-24, 2012), 
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/agsiaae12/126633.htm (discussing how, in late 2011, the 
poverty line was raised from Y1,274 to  Y2,300 a year per capita, in purchasing power 
parity terms at or above the U.S.$1.25 United Nations standard.  The new figure per day 
increased the number of Chinese in poverty from 27 million to 128m). See also Reality 
Check that Helps Nation’s Poor, SCMP, Dec. 10, 2011, 
http://www.scmp.com/article/987374/reality-check-helps-nations-poor. It is not clear from 
what year the 35% figure derives. The 35% of ethnic minorities figure would amount to 
about 40 million people). 
253  Bjorn Gustafsson & Ding Sai, Temporary and Persistent Poverty among Ethnic 
Minorities and the Majority in Rural China, 55:1 REVIEW OF INCOME AND WEALTH 588, 
604 (2009). 
254 Id. 
255 Gradin, supra note 235, at 14. 
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Geographical location plays an important role in 
defining the context of minority areas.  Minority 
communities, particularly rural minority 
communities, are usually situated in relatively 
cohesive, distinctive and isolated locations . . . 
[M]inorities inhabit mainly rural areas located in 
remote border regions, particularly in the south of 
the province.  This disadvantaged location creates a 
considerable obstacle for socioeconomic 
development. 
 
The study noted that “in 2000, nearly 80% of minority employment 
opportunities in Xinjiang were concentrated in the agricultural 
sector associated with a low income.” 256   Low-income Uygurs 
mainly live and farm in southern Xinjiang; 12% of Uygurs live in 
northern Xinjiang.  Minorities in the north, such as Kazakhs, earned 
much higher incomes “owing to favorable geographical conditions 
and to activity primarily in the animal husbandry sector.” Moreover, 
“[a]ccess to education is . . . always problematic in 
the minority countries of Xinjiang.  In general, the 
geographical features of the isolated, frontier 
regions where minority populations generally live 
create insurmountable difficulties with respect to 
access to education.  Increased distance from 
schools increases both the opportunity cost of 
acquiring education and gender disparities in the 
attendance rate.  In addition to geographical 
constraints, many teachers in remote areas do not 
have the necessary qualifications and lack 
opportunities for in-service training.” 257     
 
Because urban bias in Xinjiang’s development favors locales where 
Han are more concentrated, urbanization has not mitigated urban-
rural disparities.  
Location may also combine with customs in explaining gaps.258  
For example, the widened Han/minority rural income gap cited 
                                                
256 Cao, supra note 237, at 976-7 
257 Cao, supra note 237, at 976-7, 979. 
258 The same seems to hold for differences in educational attainment for Han and minority 
students. See Hannum & Wang, supra note 228, at 191 (finding that the same seems to 
hold for differences in educational attainment for Han and minority students). 
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above is a result of privatization and commercialization of China’s 
countryside, which created a need for peasants to seek off-farm 
employment.259  Out-migration from minority villages may be lower 
than from Han villages due to lower education levels and the 
“closed” nature of the village socioeconomic setting. 260   Thus, 
“ethnic minorities in rural areas are less likely to work outside the 
home village and such differences in the propensity for labor 
migration can negatively affect the income of minority 
households.”261  In Ningxia, Hui farmers go out more than Han 
farmers to work and as a result have closed the gap between their 
income and poverty levels and those of nearby Han.  In contrast, 
one of the main reasons contributing to urban Hui females’ 21% 
earnings gap with the Han are shorter educations and larger number 
of children.  There are “no signs of an ethnic disadvantage in 
earnings determinations.”262 
 Discrimination, Preferences and Autonomy   
      Ethnicity does affect hiring and some part of Han/minority 
income gaps.  It was found to decrease the probability of minorities 
(Hui in Lanzhou, Gansu; Uygurs in Urumqi, Xinjiang) being hired 
by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 263   It impinges on the job-
matching process for Hui and Man in Beijing, who were “more 
likely to be sorted into jobs with lower bonus awards and are more 
likely to be under and unemployed.”264  Survey data for minorities 
                                                
259 See A.S. Bhalla and Qiu Shufang, Poverty and Inequality among Chinese Minorities 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
260 Ding Sai, Nongcun hanzu he shaoshu minzu laodonglu zhuanyi de bijiao [Comparison 
of labor migration of Han and ethnic minorities], MINZU YANJIU, 2006: 5: 31-40. 
261 Hiroshi Sato and Ding Sai, Ethnicity and Income in China: the Case of Ningxia, 
CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC SYSTEMS DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, 
no. 46, at 3 (Sept. 2012). 
262 Bjorn Gustafsson and Ding Sai, Assessing Ethnic Disparities in Income and Poverty in 
China: The Case of Han and Hui in Ningxia,” Paper Prepared for the 32nd General 
Conference of The International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, (Aug. 10, 
2012) at 2-3, www.iariw.org/papers/2012/GustafssonPaper.pdf. 
263 See Xiaowei Zang Market Reform and Han-Muslim Variation in Employment in the 
Chinese State Sector in a Chinese City, 36 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 2341, 2350 (2008) 
(showing a discrepancy between Hui and Han job attainment); see also Xiaowei Zang, 
Affirmative Action, Economic Reforms and Han-Uygur Variation in Job Attainment in the 
State Sector in Urumchi, 202 CHINA QUARTERLY 344, 357-58 (2010) (finding that Uyghur 
workers are less likely than Han to find work in a state firm). 
264 Reza Hasmath et al., Ethnic Minority Disadvantages in China’s Labor Market? CHINA 
GROWTH CENTRE DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, no. 16, Oct. 2012 at 15, 
www.seh.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/DP16.pdf. 
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and Han in eastern China cities in 2004-2006 found little systematic 
wage bias between both groups, determining that 
“[t]he difference in wage outcomes between the 
Han majority and ethnic minorities can be explained 
by differences in education and job type. Once these 
factors are controlled for, the wage differential 
disappears. However, the quantitative data cannot 
explain why minorities are sorted into jobs that 
provide lower compensation than Hans.”265   
 
Thus, not much of earnings differentials may result from 
discrimination.  A study found that different socio-economic 
statuses (education, employment by SOEs, etc.) and family 
responsibilities (many more children, more housework for women, 
etc.) explain earnings differentials between Uygurs and Han in 
Urumqi,266 rather than discrimination by private employers.267  It may 
be the case that it is only for some minorities in some locales that 
there is likely to be significant job bias. 
To the extent discrimination in minority hiring exists, it may 
be more widespread in Han areas than in ethnic, autonomous areas.  
Direct evidence of hiring discrimination exists from a resume audit 
study in which researchers submitted 10,796 pairs of similar 
resumes to internet job boards in six cities for three kinds of jobs.268  
The resumes were randomly assigned names indicating applicants 
were Han, Mongol, Uygur, or Tibetan.  The pairs for Hohhot, Inner 
Mongolia were Mongols and Han; for Xinjiang, they were Uygur 
and Han.  Discrimination was measured by differences in callback 
rates.  Han/minority callback ratios were Mongolian 1.36, Uygur 
1.83, and Tibetan 2.21 to 1.269  In Chengdu and Shenzhen, minority 
                                                
265 Reza Hasmath et al., Ethnic Minority Disadvantages in China’s Labor Market? CHINA 
GROWTH CENTRE DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, no. 16, Oct. 2012 at 4, 16, 
www.seh.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/DP16.pdf. 
266 Xiaowei Zang, Gender Roles and Ethnic Income Inequality in Urumqi, 35 ETHNIC & 
RACIAL STUDIES 238 (2012). 
267 Xiaowei Zang, Uyghur-Han Earnings Differentials in Urumuqi, 65 CHINA JOURNAL 141 
(2011). 
268 Margaret Maurer-Fazio, Ethnic Discrimination in China’s Internet Job Board Labor 
Market, 12 IZA JOURNAL OF MIGRATION 1, 2 (2012), 
http://www.izajom.com/content/1/1/12. (showing how similar studies have found 
significant levels of discrimination against ethnic minorities in the U.S., Sweden, Australia 
and Canada.) 
269 Id. at 10. 
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callback rates were much lower than Han rates.270  In Kunming, the 
callback rate for Mongolians differed little from Han, and in 
Nanjing, only the callback rate for Tibetans was significantly lower 
than for Han.  In Hohhot, callback rates for Mongolians and Han 
were very similar and in Urumqi, the callback rate for Uygurs was 
higher than for Han.  Some 47% of all firms, but 61% of SOEs 
called back both Han and minority candidates; 46% (32% of SOEs) 
called back only Han and 7% (6.8% of SOEs) called back only 
minorities.271  About 61% of firms in minority areas called back Han 
and minorities, 16% called back only Han, and 23% called back 
only minorities.272  Thus, “[f]irms in minority areas appear to treat 
minority candidates equitably,” even though the firms were in cities 
with huge Han majorities (Hohhot, 87%; Urumqi, 75%).273 
In Urumqi, there is nevertheless a widespread perception of 
discrimination,274  even if evidence of it is mixed and outcomes 
largely depend on the category of employer.275 
     Such studies point to a key difference in hiring 
discrimination in China compared to the U.S.  In China, 75% of 
minority people live in ethnic autonomous areas and in such areas 
hiring discrimination appears to be less prevalent than in Han areas.  
The U.S., however, has no officially designated minority areas 
except reservations, where about one million Native Americans 
(less than 1% of the minority population) live.276  Ethnic regional 
autonomy in China, but not in the U.S., thus may help mitigate 
discrimination.           
   A study of factors influencing income gaps in seven 
provinces where minorities were more than 9% of the population 
concluded that the “income disparity between the Han and minority 
                                                
270 Id. at 12. 
271 Id. at 15. 
272 Id. at 16. 
273 Margaret Maurer-Fazio, Ethnic Discrimination in China’s Internet Job Board Labor 
Market, 12 IZA JOURNAL OF MIGRATION 1, 16 (2012), 
http://www.izajom.com/content/1/1/12. (showing how similar studies have found 
significant levels of discrimination against ethnic minorities in the US, Sweden, Australia 
and Canada.); Id. at 11. 
274 See Xiaowei Zang, Scaling the Socioeconomic Ladder: Uyghur Perceptions of Class 
Status, 21 J. CONTEMPORARY CHINA 1029 (2012) (showing a 2007 survey of discrimination 
perception). 
275  See, e.g., Xiaowei Zang, Affirmative Action, Economic Reforms, and Han-Uyghur 
Variation in Job Attainment in the State Sector in Urumchi, 202 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 
334, 357 (2010) (showing the Uyghur-Han job variation). 
276 Tina Norris et al., The American Indian and Alaska Native Populations, U.S. BUREAU 
OF THE CENSUS at 13 (2012), www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-10.pdf. 
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population is not that large . . . instead, [it is] inequalities within the 
Han population and among the minority populations [that] 
contribute significantly to the overall Gini coefficient.”277  The main 
factor determining income differences in rural areas is that ethnic 
minorities generally do not live in the same places as rural Han.  
Thus, the smaller the area analyzed, the smaller the Han-minorities 
income gap.  In some rural areas in Guizhou and Yunnan, minorities 
are better off than their Han neighbors.278  Another study concluded 
that,  
“[i]f there is income gap between ethnic groups 
within a larger region, [it] stems mainly from the 
geographical distribution of different ethnic groups 
in different areas, and not from ethnic factors. 
Moreover, long-standing government policies of 
giving various preferences to minorities have 
created a situation where Hui status not only does 
not give rise to discrimination in income but even 
confers higher income on these people.”279 
 
Preliminary results of a study of employee recruitment in 
Yunnan agriculture in 2005 found that “ethnic minority status has a 
significantly positive effect on the probability of employment . . . 
even after controlling for gender, education, age and spatial 
distribution . . . .”280  Preferential policies may thus affect being 
hired to work in agriculture.  A statistical study in Gansu and 
Guizhou has shown that preferential policies have “played a 
remarkably significant role in the promotion of economic growth in 
the ethnic minority areas.  These policies have helped in effectively 
accelerating the economic development of the ethnic minority 
                                                
277 A.S. Bhalla and Luo Dan, Poverty and Exclusion of Minorities in China and India 
(Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) at 105 (describing how the Gini coefficient 
measures the degree of inequality with a population, with zero as completely equal income 
distribution and one as a single person having all the income.). 
278 Bjorn Gustafsson and Li Shi, The Ethnic Minority-Majority Income Gap in Rural China 
during Transition, 51 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 805-822 (2003).   
279 Li Shi and Ding Sai, An Empirical Analysis of Income Inequality Between a Minority 
and a Majority in Urban China: the Case of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, GLOBAL 
COE HI-STAT DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, no. 022, Jan. 2009, at 17, http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-
u.ac.jp/rs/ bitstream/10086/16463/1/gd08-022.pdf . 
280  Bente Castro Campos, Ethnic Minorities, Occupational Attainment and Employer 
Recruitment Choices in Rural China, available at 
www.iamo.de/uploads/media/Project_Castro_Campos_02.pdf.   
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areas.”281  Being a minority does not however much impact the 
growth of peasant incomes, except in pastoral and semi-pastoral 
areas, in part because inequality is created by the increasingly 
uneven distribution of land, which is mainly a function of higher 
minority birth rates.282   
A study of whether ethnic status in rural Guizhou and Hunan 
influences the probability of dropping out of school before nine 
years of education found no significant disparity between minorities 
and Han once community-specific effects are taken into account.283  
A study of Han/minority health inequality in nine Chinese provinces 
found it was significant and growing in 1989-2006, but that “the 
overall minority-Han difference in health and nutrition status is 
explained largely by the difference in endowments, particularly the 
difference in provincial economic development level.”284  A paper 
using panel data from 1989-2006 concluded that Han/minority 
inequality in household income is best explained by regional 
inequalities.285  Another 1989-2006 panel data study showed that, 
after controlling for gender, education, experience, and work unit 
type, 
the hourly wage of ethnic minorities in urban areas 
was 12.8 percent higher than their Han counterparts 
in 1989.  By 1991, this wage differential has 
dissipated – the wage difference between Han and 
ethnic minorities was mostly negative, but not 
significantly different in the remaining years of the 
sample.  Similarly, there is no evidence of wage 
differentials in rural areas.286 
 
                                                
281 Xing Li, Introduction and Impact of Preferential Policies on Minority Groups in China, 
Working Paper, CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF AGRICULTURAL 
ECONOMISTS (2012). 
282 Id.   
283 Kelly Labar & Bente Castro Campos, Are Children Dropping Out During Compulsory 
Schooling, and Are There Differences Between Ethnic Groups? The Cases of Rural Areas 
in Guizhou and Hunan Provinces, China, 7 INT’L ECON. AND FIN. J., no. 1, 2012, at 99, 
123-4. 
284 Ouyang Yusi & Per Pinstrup-Andersen, Health Inequality between Ethnic Minority and 
Han Populations in China, 40 WORLD DEVELOPMENT, no. 7, 1452, 1465 (2012). 
285 Christopher Sullivan, Ethnicity & Income Inequality in Rural China, Working Paper, 
for POPULATION ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA ANNUAL CONFERENCE (2011), available at 
http://paa2011.princeton.edu/papers/111243. 
286 Reza Hasmath, The Ethnic Penalty: Immigration, Education and the Labor Market 104 
(Ashgate 2012).   
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It is often assumed that Han migrants to minority areas have 
higher incomes than host area ethnic minorities, but a study of 
service sector employment found Uygur internal migrants to 
Urumqi, Xinjiang are better educated, more formally employed, and 
often higher-earning than self-initiated, mainly interprovincial Han 
migrants to the city.287  A study of income attainment for Han locals, 
Han migrants and Uygurs in Xinjiang, based on the 2005 mini-
census, found that the overall income disadvantages of Uygurs came 
mainly from within-sector difference, not sector segregation. 288  
Within the non-agricultural sector, Uygurs were more likely than 
Han to be in government and other institutions.289  They earned 
about the same as Han locals, reflecting preferential policies.290  In 
sectors with less state influence and more marketization, ethnic 
inequality exists, as Han locals are more likely to enter SOEs, Han 
migrants are more present in private enterprises, and more Uygurs 
are self-employed.291  It is posited that Uygur frustration arises from 
competition with Han in these sectors.292   
Ethnic disparities in China have grown partly for the same 
reason as in the US:  deepened neoliberalism, i.e. privatization and a 
retreat of the state in key areas.  The widened gap in China may 
however largely result from a general increase in urban/rural 
disparities.  Overall, it may not be as sharp as in the U.S., where 
comparison is feasible, such as with urban incomes. 
 Ethnic and National Identity of Minorities     
China, like most states with national minorities, also has 
ethnic secessionists, whose level of national identity is obviously 
low. 293  There do seem however to be smaller differences in degrees 
of national identity between Han and China’s minorities than exists 
between U.S. white people and minorities.  In a 2008 Asian 
                                                
287 Anthony Howell & C. Cindy Fan, Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang: a Survey of 
Han and Uyghur Migrants in Urumqi, 52 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECON., no. 1, 2011, 
at 119. 
288 WU XIAOGANG & XI SONG, Ethnic Stratification amid China’s Economic Transition: 
Evidence from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, SOC. SCI. RES. 44, 158-72 (2014).  
289 Id. 
290 Id.  
291 Id.  
292 Id. 
293 In the past, China has had Han secessionists as well.  See Edward McCord, The Power 
of the Gun: the Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism 219-20 (University of 
California Press, 1993). 
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Barometer poll, Chinese responded to the question “Are you proud 
to be a Chinese?”294  Using a 1-4 scale (4 very proud, 3 proud, 2 not 
quite proud and 1 not proud at all), in eastern China, Han and 
minorities both had a 3.3 average; in central China, Han had 3.4 and 
minorities 3.2; in western China, Han had 3.2 and minorities 2.8.295 
 The 2006-2007 Chinese Ethnicity Survey of high school 
students asked “How close do you feel to your country?” and “How 
close do you feel to your ethnic group?” with choices being “not 
close at all,” “not very close,” “close,” and “very close.”296  The 
results were coded to convert them into a “feeling thermometer” on 
a scale of 0-100 and showed higher ethnic identity among minorities 
than Han, but uniformly high national identity: 
 
Table 5:  National and Ethnic Identity in China297 
Ethnicity Country ID Ethnic ID 
Han 89 80 
Hui 90 89 
Mongol 90 91 
Tibetan 89 91 
Kazak 89 95 
Uyghur 90 96 
 
Among 1,600 high school students polled as part of the same 
survey in seven Xinjiang locations (74% Uygur, Hui, Kazakh and 
Mongolian; 26% Han), 78% felt “extremely close” to their ethnic 
group, while 74% felt extremely close to China.  The two identities 
were highly correlated.  Asked to choose between Xinjiang, Chinese 
or both identities, twice as many Uygur respondents chose Chinese 
over Xinjiang identity, while 44% chose both.  The study 
determined that the high degree of national identity found among 
Xinjiang minority students was partially created by affirmative 
action programs.298 
                                                
294 Shan Wei, Comparing Ethnic Minorities and Han Chinese in China: Life Satisfaction, 
Economic Well Being and Political Attitudes, 2 EAST ASIAN POL’Y, no. 2, 2010, at 13, 21.  
295 Id. 
296 Wenfang Tang & Gaochao He, Separate but Loyal: Ethnicity and Nationalism in China, 
36, EAST-WEST CENTER (2010). 
297 Id.  
298 Benjamin Joseph Darr, Nationalism and State Legitimation in Contemporary China, 
137-51 (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa).  See also Tang, supra 
note 296, at 43 (“the Chinese state has so far managed to keep ethnic tension under control 
by using affirmative action to promote Chinese identity among minorities.”). Education 
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  Question from a random sample 2008 China Survey, going 
to levels of Chinese nationalism, found Han had a high “feeling 
thermometer” level of 84, with the levels for Hui (89) and Uygurs 
(87) even higher.299  Moreover, “linguistic and religious minorities 
such as the Huis, the Manchus, the Uyghurs, and the Mongols show 
just as high levels of nationalism as the Han majority.”300  The levels 
of nationalism of these ethnic groups all exceeded the very high U.S. 
level of nationalism.301  It also found that “[c]ontrary to what one 
might expect, Han Chinese are significantly less supportive of the 
state than minority groups.  This effect is not substantively large, 
but it holds true despite controlling for confounding factors such as 
family income, religiosity, education, and rural community 
type . . . .”302  In contrast, in a 2004 poll in the U.S., 39% of white 
people, but only 22% of black people, indicated that they trust the 
U.S. federal government most of the time.303  The racialization of 
trust in the U.S. government reversed after Obama’s election304 and 
the misplaced expectation that Obama would advance the interests 
of ethnic minorities, especially African Americans, may explain 
why there have not been “riots” despite the continued decline in the 
position of black people under his tenure. 
A survey among more than three hundred ethnic minority 
“no-fee pre-service” students  -- i.e. those training at government 
expense to become teachers -- at Southwest University (Xinan 
daxue) in Chongqing produced findings in accord with those of the 
2008 China Survey discussed above.305  These students hailed from 
25 ethnic groups (most prominently Miao, Tujia and Uygur) and on 
the whole had a strong sense of identity with their ethnic groups, 
                                                                                                           
may be another factor: the more education students had using Hanyu (Mandarin), the less 
attachment they had to ethnic identity, but the effect of such study on national identity was 
unclear. Darr, at 150. 
299 Tang, supra note 296, at 38-9.  Minorities displayed no fear in giving answers not 
supportive of the government in response to the survey’s other politically-sensitive 
questions. Id. at 39-41.  
300 Tang & Darr, supra note 222, at 818-19. 
301 Id. 
302 Darr, supra note 298, at 171. 
303 Public Broadcasting Service, Election 2004, PBS (Feb. 27, 2004), 
http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/hispanicvote.html. 
304 Dorian T. Warren, What Race Tells Us About Anti-Government Attitudes, THE NATION 
(Mar. 21, 2012) http://www.thenation.com/article/166972/what-race-tells-us-about-anti-
government-attitudes.  
305  Yang Shuhan et al., Ethnic Identity of Minority No-Fee Pre-service Students, 46 
CHINESE EDUC. AND SOC’Y, 76, 86 (2013). 
2014] U.S./INDIA MODEL FOR CHINA’S ETHNIC POLICIES          149 
 
even higher than their identity with the Chinese nation.306  The two 
identities however were positively correlated; that is, in general the 
higher the sense of ethnic identity, the higher the sense of Chinese 
national identity.307  Their identification with the Chinese nation’s 
society and culture was moreover found to be significantly higher 
than their identification with their own ethnic group’s society and 
culture, and more advanced undergraduates had less ethnic identity 
than younger ones, was explained as resulting from greater contact 
with Han students.308  
There is substantial ethnic inequality in China and reasons 
for it are both the same and different from those in India and the U.S.  
Neo-liberalist shrinking of the state’s role vis-à-vis minority 
interests, everywhere arrests efforts to achieve ethnic equality.  
Indians STs’ rurality plays a continuing role, but accelerated 
plundering of adivasi in the last couple decades by government, in 
the service of industry and particularly through dispossession, is 
also highly relevant.  In the U.S., racialization remains pervasive 
and many gains made by the mid-20th Century Civil Rights 
Movement have been eroded by the shriveling of the few extant 
ethnic policies, such as affirmative action, and by a huge increase in 
minority imprisonment. 
     Every inequality in China has been widened by more than 
three decades of reform. Expanded private enterprise has 
particularly widened the scope for ethnic discrimination in hiring.309  
Meanwhile “Chinese anti-discrimination laws have not developed to 
tackle the kinds of discriminatory behavior that have appeared with 
the establishment of the market economy.”310  Employment and 
services discrimination is not covered by the criminal law or 
detailed in civil law.311  There are no “concrete remedies for a victim 
of discrimination . . . .  This is why there are no cases in minority 
regions about employment discrimination despite the fact that the 
ethnicity requirement in civil servant examinations and other 
discriminatory behavior are main topics of private conversation 
among people in these regions.”312 
                                                
306 Id. at 85. 
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308 Id. at 86. 
309 Gulzazat Tursun, Integrating Minorities through Legislation: a Perspective on China, 
15 (2011), http://works.bepress.com/gulazat_tursun/1 (click “Download” link). 
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Yet discrimination, while present for some minorities in 
some spheres, appears to play a lesser role in ethnic inequalities 
than in India and the U.S.  The studies discussed above indicate that 
one reason for that is countervailing effects of ethnic regional 
autonomy and preferential policies. 313   Despite dis-equalization 
inherent in the reforms, these policies still play a role, at least as to 
the ranks of government and parts of the state-owned economy.   
Although India is not at all depoliticized in the sense that 
proponents of depoliticization of ethnic minorities in China 
conceive it,314 India’s many policies to address collective interests of 
its minorities are offset by other policies that allow officials to 
divert funds for social services and encourage predatory 
corporations to dispossess adivasi.  It is the pervasively racialized 
U.S. however that epitomizes depoliticization, by seeming to hardly 
have ethnic policies.315  Yet, that has not made U.S. minorities adopt 
the same attitudes as white people toward the state: 
disproportionately, minorities mistrust the state or even reject it.  
Within the context of existing political arrangements, minorities are 
more dissatisfied with the level of support it provides: 60% of white 
people exit-polled in the 2012 elections thought the government 
should do less, while 58% of Latinos and 73% of black people 
thought it should do more.316  Asked in a 2011 poll how much of a 
role government should play in trying to improve the social and 
economic position of minority groups, 19% of white people said a 
major role, 50% said a minor role, and 30% said no role at all.317  
Among African Americans, it was 59%, 32% and 8%.318 Asked 
                                                
313 While preferential policies are not nearly as potent now as they were in the Mao era, 
due to privatization, they remain sufficiently desired that quite a few Han seek to change to 
a minority status, legally or illegally.  See Lin Meilian, Joining the Majority, GLOBAL 
TIMES (Nov. 11, 2012).  
314  See generally Niraja Gopal Jayal, Representing India: Ethnic Diversity and the 
Governance of Public Institutions (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) (for an overview of the 
many political institutions that serve Indian government ethnic policies). 
315 The absence of ethnic policies itself amounts to an ethnic policy, which may equate to 
what sociologist and U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan euphemistically termed 
“benign neglect.” See generally Richard Marcus, Benign Neglect Reconsidered, 148 U. PA. 
L. REV. (2009). 
316 Nancy Benac and Connie Cass, Face of U.S. Changing; Elections to Look Different, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 12, 2012, 3:55 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/face-us-
changing-elections-look-different-0. 
317 Frank Newport, Blacks, Whites Differ on Government’s Role in Civil Rights, GALLUP, 1 
(Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/149087/blacks-whites-differ-government-
role-civil-rights.aspx. 
318 Id. 
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whether new civil rights law are needed to reduce discrimination 
against black people, 15% of white people agreed; 83% did not.319  
Among black people, 52% said such laws are needed, 48% said they 
are not.320  Not surprisingly, “in a 2009 Pew poll, 58[%] of African-
Americans and 53[%] of Hispanics said they favor preferential 
treatment to improve the position of black people and other 
minorities.  Only 22[%] of white people agreed.”321 
 Intermarriage: More Prevalent in the U.S. than China? 
If U.S. minorities are not highly supportive of the state, they 
also are not necessarily more connected to the majority population 
than China’s minorities.  Some scholars322 in addition to Ma Rong 
have asserted that a prime indication the U.S. has more stable ethnic 
relations than China is a higher rate of ethnic intermarriage.  Yet, 
intermarriage rates are higher in China than in the U.S., when the 
U.S.’ much higher minority proportion is taken into account, as 
having a larger percentage of minorities creates more intermarriage 
opportunities.  In fact, China’s interethnic marriage rate was higher 
than the U.S.’ in 2000, the base year of the main study of 
intermarriage in China.  In the U.S. in 2000, 2.6% of families were 
ethnically inter-married;323 in China in 2000, 3.23% of Chinese were 
in bi-ethnic households.  Rates among China’s ethnic groups varied 
due to geographical concentration, group size, customs, etc.; for 
examples, 1.05% of Uygurs, but 7.71% of Tibetans were 
intermarried.  The highest rate was near 90%. The average for 
China’s 55 minority groups was about 25%.324 
                                                
319 Id. 
320 Id. 
321 Dorian Warren, What Race Tells us about Anti-Government Attitudes, THE NATION (Apr. 
9, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/166972/what-race-tells-us-about-anti-
government-attitudes (internal quotation marks omitted). 
322 James Leibold, When Will China have its First Minority President?, THE ATLANTIC 
(Nov. 8, 2012), www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/11/when-will-china-have-
its-first-minority-president/264961/. 
323 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 54, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2011). 
324 Li Xiaoxia, Zhongguo ge minzu jian zu ji hunyin xianzhuang de fenxi (Analysis of the 
current situation of each Chinese ethnic group’s inter-ethnic inter-marriage, ZHONGGUO 
RENKOU 28:3 (2004): 69- et seq.  The 1990 census indicated that 99.4% of bi-ethnic 
households, the proxy for intermarriage, had a Han and minority person.  Rachel Butera, 
Chinese Interethnic Marriage: Passion or Rational Choice 41 (May 7, 2010) (Unpublished 
B.A. thesis, Middlebury College) (available at 
http://middlab.middlebury.edu/category/themes/family/).  See also Rachel Butera and 
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That the availability of other ethnic groups with which to 
intermarry is a key determinant of intermarriage, can be seen as to 
Tibetans.  In 2000, 7.7% of all Tibetans were intermarried, but the 
rate for Tibetans in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), where 
non-Tibetans were only about 6% of the population, was only 0.7%.  
More than half of China’s Tibetans live outside the TAR, in areas 
where non-Tibetans are generally a much higher proportion than in 
the TAR.  Thus, more non-TAR Tibetans are likely to intermarry.  
Even in the TAR, the rate of intermarriage appears to have 
increased rapidly.  In 1990, there were 2,369 Tibetan/Han 
intermarried households.  The number increased to 7,343 by 2000 
and was geographically more dispersed.325  Reportedly, by 2008 
“[m]ore than 20% of all marriages in Tibet each year were inter-
ethnic marriages, and the rate in Lhasa has an annual double-digit 
growth.”326 
  The proportion of the intermarried U.S. couples also 
increased significantly in the 2000s, reaching 8% in in 2008 and 
8.4% in 2010, with 4% of all married couples in the U.S. then of 
“different races” 327  and the rest presumably marriages between 
Latinos (not counted as a “race” by the U.S. Census Bureau) and 
other groups.  From 1980-2008 however, “different groups 
experienced different trends.  Rates more than doubled among white 
people and nearly tripled among black people.  But for both 
Hispanics and Asians, rates were nearly identical. . . .”328  Moreover, 
“despite the large immigrant influx, there has been little evidence to 
                                                                                                           
Thierry Warin, Chinese Interethnic Marriage: Passion or Rational Choice, 4 INT’L J. OF 
ECON. AND BUS. RESEARCH, no. 6, 2012, at 738. 
325  Ma Rong, POPULATION AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY TIBET, 263 (Hong Kong 
University Press, eds., 2011). 
326 Rate of Inter-Ethnic Marriages Rises Annually in Lhasa, ALL-CHINA FEDERATION OF 
WOMEN (Mar. 28, 2008), http://www.womenofchina.cn/html/womenofchina/report/91835-
1.htm. See also Xu Zhenming, Xiahe xian Labuleng zhen zu ji tonghun zhuangkuang 
diaocha (Survey on Interethnic Marriage in Labrang Township, Xiahe County), 6 GANSU 
SHEHUI KEXUE 192, 192-195 (2005) (discussing a study finding that the number of Han-
Tibetan marriages almost tripled between 1978 and 2000 in a township in Gansu Province 
known for its Tibetan Buddhist monasteries). 
327 Emily Alpert, Interracial Couples on Rise in U.S., Census Data Show, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 
1, 2013. 
328  Jeffrey S. Passel et al., Marrying Out, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (PRC), 2010, 
ww.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/755-marrying-out.pdf; The Rise of Intermarriage: 
Rates, Characteristics Vary by Race and Gender, PRC (Feb. 16, 2012), 
www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/02/16/the-rise-of-intermarriage/. 
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date of an emerging multi-ethnic American identity or of a new 
American “melting pot” stirred by intermarriage.”329 
  Data on intermarried households in China in 2010 is not yet 
available.  Hong Kong sociologist Raymond SK Wong, extracting 
intermarriage data for the 791,946 married couples in the 2005 
mini-census, found that 87,155 (11%) were in bi-ethnic 
households.330 
   Minorities were 8.5% of Chinese in 2010,331 but more than 
28% of Americans.332 The U.S. minority proportion was thus 3.3 
times that of China.  The percentage of China’s intermarried 
households likely increased in the 2000s, due to greater interethnic 
contact as minorities urbanize, a shortage of Han women because of 
China’s skewed sex ratio, and increased utility for Han in marrying 
a minority as the urban one-child policy tightened.333  Yet, even if 
the proportion of intermarried Chinese was unchanged in the 2000s, 
the U.S. proportion of intermarried in 2010 would only be 260% 
that of China, while the proportion of minorities in the U.S. is 330% 
that of China.  Intermarriage is even more pronounced in China than 
in the U.S. given China’s high geographical concentration of 
minorities, which contrasts with the much more even geographical 
spread of U.S. minorities.  China’s minorities are also 
disproportionately rural; U.S. minorities are disproportionately 
urban, while workplaces and neighborhoods in urban areas tend to 
be ethnically much more mixed than in rural areas.  In fact, ethnic 
                                                
329 Since the 1990s there has been a “retreat from intermarriage” in the form of declining 
rates of out-marriage among some rapidly growing immigrant groups . . . . [So that] 
additional increases in interracial marriage are no longer guaranteed, nor do they lend 
themselves to unambiguous interpretations among changing race relations or group 
boundaries.” Qian Zhenchao and Daniel Lichter, Changing Patterns of Interracial 
Marriage in a Multiracial Society, 73 J. OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 1063, 1065-7 
(2011).  
330 Raymond Sin-Kwok Wong, Educational Homogamy and Inter-ethnic Marriages in 
China, Address at the International Sociological Association, Research Committee on 
Social Stratification and Mobility (May 14-16, 2009). 
331 Press Release, NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, Press Release on Major 
Figures of the 2010 National Population Census (Apr. 28, 2011) (on file with author). 
332 Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census Shows America’s Diversity (Mar. 24, 
2011) (on file with author).  See also Butera, supra note 324 (indicating that the rate of 
intermarriage had increased over time using 1990, 2000 and 2005 census 
333 Wang Jun, The Migration of Ethnic Minorities in the Urbanization Process in China, 9 
CANADIAN DIVERSITY 5-7 (2011); Ai Deng, et al., Urbanization Processes among Ethnic 
Groups in Western China, in ETHNIC MINORITIES AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ASIA: 
REALITIES AND CHALLENGES (Cao Huhua ed., 2009). See also Butera, supra note 324 at 91, 
95.  
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intermarriage in China is now common enough that it is several 
times more prevalent than interprovincial marriage.334 
Many sub-national studies confirm that, mutatis mutandis, 
intermarriage in China is at least as common as in the U.S.  In 
Beijing at the 1990 census, when 3% of people there were 
minorities, 2.2% of Han, 16.7% of Hui, 87.3% of Manzu, 90.5% of 
Mongolians, and 14.3% of Koreans were intermarried.335  In Inner 
Mongolia in 1990, when 15% of inhabitants were Mongols, Han-
Mongol couples were 40% of all marriages.336  In 1994-1995 in 
Hohhot, where 13% were minorities, 23% of Han, 78% of Mongols, 
99% of Man and 33% of Huis married inter-ethnically. 337   In 
comparison, U.S. 1990 census data shows the rate of intermarried 
white people as 1.5%, black people 4.1%, Asians 17.7% and “some 
other race” (almost all Latinos), 15.7%.338 
For Yunnan province, where 33% of people were minorities, 
1990 data showed 7.3% of households had Han/minority couples -- 
5% in Han areas and 11% in minority areas.339  For Yunnan’s capital 
Kunming in 1990 “intermarriage was prevalent among all 
minorities . . . .  The highly positive market conditions for 
intermarriage were created by the institutions and policies, among 
them preferential policies for ethnic minorities and . . . highly 
ethnically mixed workplaces and neighborhoods.”340  In 1991-1996, 
                                                
334 Li Tao et al., How Status Inheritance Affects Marriage Segregation (2012) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). See generally Tang & He, supra note 14 at 43-44 (giving 
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eds., 2003). 
337 Wang Junmin, Meng, Man, Hui, Han, si zu tonghun yanjiu: Huhehaote de shiqu de 
ge’an (Mongolian, Manchu, Hui, Han, Research on Four Ethnic Groups’ Intermarriage: 
Cases from Hohhot City), 24 XIBEI MINZU YANJIU 158, 158-159 (1999). 
338 Sharon Lee and Barry Edmonston, New Marriages, New Families: U.S. Racial and 
Latino Intermarriage, 60:2  POPULATION BULLETIN 3-38 (2005). 
339 Lu Zhaohe, Yunnan minzu jian tonghun de jiating leixing yu renkou jiegou yanjiu,” 
(Research on family type composition of ethnic intermarriage and population), 26 YUNNAN 
DAXUE RENWEN SHEHUI KEXUE XUEBAO 6, 63 (2000). 
340  Wei Xing, Patterns, Mechanisms and Nature of Ethnic Intermarriage in China, 
Kunming Case, 1950-1996 (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto) 
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for the three largest ethnic minority groups in the city, among Yi, 
only 15.7% were in-married (75% were married to Han, the 
remainder married other minorities); for Bai, only 8.6% were in-
married (81.8% married Han); and for Hui, 27.1% were in-married 
(67.2% married Han).  Status homogamy moreover was highly 
prevalent: “there was no exchange between Han ethnic status and 
minority socioeconomic status, which has often been found in the 
North American context”; that is, in contrast to findings from the 
U.S., Chinese ethnic minorities of higher socioeconomic status do 
not marry ethnic majority people of lower economic status, but 
rather minority/Han couples tend to have the same socio-economic 
statuses.341 
  A 2002-2003 intermarriage survey was carried out in 
Tacheng, Xinjiang, a city of 150,000, with a minority percentage 
close to that of the U.S.’s ethnic minority/”mixed race” proportion 
of 37% in 2011.  Some 15% of new U.S. marriages then were 
interracial/interethnic.  In Tacheng, 40% of new marriages were bi-
ethnic.342  It appears then that where ethnic groups interact in China, 
the intermarriage rate is at least as high as in the U.S.  The main 
exceptions are Ningxia and much of Xinjiang, where there is a fairly 
low degree of minority/Han interaction and less-educated Muslims 
religiously eschew exogamy.343 
 CONCLUSION: NO MODELS, NO VIABLE CASE FOR 
“DEPOLITICIZATION” 
Just as there is no reason to conclude that intermarriage has 
diminished the U.S.’ pervasive racial/ethnic divisions, there is no 
compelling evidence that the U.S. or India has generally lower 
levels of ethnic minority disaffection than China.  That is so despite 
both countries being less proven targets of external forces seeking to 
                                                
341  Wei Xing, Prevalence of Ethnic Intermarriage in Kunming: Social Exchange or 
Insignificance of Ethnicity? 8 ASIAN ETHNICITY 2 165-179 (2007). 
342 Li Xiaoxia, Xinjiang Tacheng shi diaocha ji hunxin diaocha (Survey of interethnic 
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promote minority disaffection than China.344  While complex arrays 
of those and other factors continue to produce conflict involving 
parts of China’s Uygur and Tibetan populations, survey results 
indicate that “officially designed assimilation policies, such as 
improvement of socioeconomic status, Chinese-language learning, 
and political recruitment into the Communist Youth League, did 
lead to greater acceptance of the Han people among minorities [and] 
also led to greater ethnic tolerance of all groups, not only the Han 
people.”345 
Many changes can be made to China’s ethnic policies that 
may reduce ethnic inequality and strengthen national coherence.346  
There is however no indication that anything is to be gained by 
diminishing existing minority rights in order to apply ineffective 
Indian and U.S. models.  Given that these models allow for 
demonstrably pervasive invidious discrimination or ethnic 
plundering, their application in China, would likely result in both 
greater inter-ethnic socio-economic disparities and increased 
minority mistrust of Han and the state.347  It is quite possible that the 
perspicacious proponents of depoliticizing China’s ethnic relations 
realize that and chose the U.S., India and Brazil as models, not 
because they vindicate their proposals, but rather because they are 
large and influential countries and states of the sort that liberals 
prefer.  Russia, another large, influential semi-authoritarian state, 
cannot serve as a model because it retains some features of the pre-
existing Soviet model of ethnic relations, from which proponents of 
depoliticization (erroneously) claim China’s system was copied.348  
Other globally significant states either still have small numbers of 
                                                
344 Shan Wei, Explaining Ethnic Protests and Ethnic Policy in China, 1 INT’L J. OF CHINA 
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(Feb. 10, 2010), www.mzb.com.cn/html/Home/report/276292-1.htm. 
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minority peoples (e.g. South Korea, Argentina) or have been 
moving their ethnic policies in the opposite direction from that 
proposed by the advocates of a second generation of ethnic policies 
(e.g. Canada, Australia).  Most other states are too globally 
insignificant, too small or too generally problematic to be 
candidates for model status, even if, rather exceptionally, they may 
have a low degree of ethnic conflict. 
Because proponents of depoliticizing China’s ethnic 
relations contrast a U.S. model with China’s policies and have not 
studied, but have overestimated the position of U.S. minorities, they 
may also underestimate the position of China’s minorities.  The 
relationship between international knowledge, with reference to the 
U.S., and domestic knowledge in China has been analyzed using a 
survey and field experiment that found that empirical overestimates 
of Western socioeconomic conditions drive negative opinions by 
Chinese about China.  Chinese who have a too “rosy” a view of 
conditions in the U.S. and other Western states thus strongly tend to 
have across-the-board lower evaluations of China and the Chinese 
government, driven by these overestimations.349  If, as has long been 
understood, many Chinese intellectuals view the U.S. government 
as successfully promoting the “diversity and inclusiveness” of U.S. 
society,350 that view tends to make them more negative about the 
Chinese state and society and seek to replace China’s approach to 
ethnic relations with perceived U.S.-style policies.         
In the absence of models, proposals to depoliticize ethnic 
relations in China amount to liberalist utopianism.  Though these 
proposals aim to benefit both minorities and Han by preserving 
China’s territorial integrity, in other respects their implementation 
would likely set back efforts to narrow ethnic disparities and thus 
imperil prospects for ethnic peace over the long term.  Rather than 
diminishing collective rights for minorities, non-separatist proposals 
to add to rights, attack ethnic socio-economic disparities, and 
increase minority political participation and leadership might be 
given serious consideration, with the aim of achieving the 
                                                
349 Huang Haifeng, International Knowledge and Domestic Attitudes in a Changing Society, 
paper presented at Fudan/UC Center, CHINA’S DOMESTIC CHALLENGES CONF., UC SAN 
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longstanding state goal of ethnic equality in fact (shishishangde 
pingdeng).351 
   Contrary to a conception common among Chinese 
intellectuals that such a course is not possible because Han would 
oppose it, there may be a popular base for just such an effort in 
China and apparently a wider base than exists in either the U.S. or 
India.  A 2008 random sample poll in 16 countries 352  by 
WorldPublicOpinion.org, the publication of the University of 
Maryland’s Program on International Policy Attitudes, asked 
whether governments should make an effort to prevent 
discrimination based on a person’s race or ethnicity.  The 16-
country average was 79% agreement, while 46% of Indians, 83% of 
Americans and 90% of Chinese agreed.  Asked how important it is 
for people of different races and ethnicities to be treated equally, the 
16 country-average was that 69% said it is very important and 21% 
said it is somewhat important, while 44% of Indians said it is very 
important and 15% said it is somewhat important.  The 
corresponding figures for the Americans were 79% and 17% and for 
Chinese 90% and 8%.  Queried whether government should do 
more to prevent discrimination based on a person’s race or ethnicity, 
the 16 country-average was 54% saying it should, while 28% of 
Indians, 45% of Americans and 70% of Chinese agreed it should.  
Asked whether employers should or should not be allowed to refuse 
to hire a qualified person because of the person’s race or ethnicity, 
the 16-country average of “shoulds” was 19% and the average of 
“should nots” was 75%, while for India the “shoulds” were 30% and 
“should nots” were 43%.  The figures for Americans were 13% and 
86% and for Chinese 10% and 88%.  Queried whether government 
has the responsibility to try to prevent employers from refusing to 
hire someone because of the person’s race or ethnicity, the 16-
country average who said it does was 60%, while for India it was 
27%, for the U.S. 69% and for China 77%.353 
The report’s analysts concluded about Indians, Americans and 
Chinese in the context of the nations surveyed that 
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Indians stand out as the public with the weakest 
levels of support for racial equality . . . Indians have 
the largest number who do not support the 
government taking more action to protect people 
from ethnic or racial discrimination.  They also 
have the second-lowest number saying that their 
government has the responsibility to prevent 
racially or ethnically discriminatory hiring 
practices . . . modest majorities of Indians say that 
equal treatment of different races and ethnicities is 
important . . . . 
 
Americans widely believe that the government 
should make an effort to prevent racial and ethnic 
discrimination, but a majority says that the 
government is already doing enough in that regard 
or should not be involved in such efforts. 
 
The Chinese are among the publics with the greatest 
support for importance of equal treatment for 
different races and ethnicities, second only to 
Mexicans among the publics polled.  China also has 
the second-largest majority rejecting employers 
having the right to discriminate based on race or 
ethnicity, and are among the largest majorities that 
favor their government making efforts to prevent 
racial and ethnic discrimination.354 
 
     The data and analysis of the report consistently show that 
negative attitudes toward ethnic discrimination and positive 
attitudes toward taking action against it are stronger or much 
stronger in China than in the U.S. and India respectively.  The prime 
policy question that confronts analysts of the ethnic policies in 
China then is whether the Chinese government can be made to alter 
its policies in ways that diminishes, rather than increase ethnic 
inequality and antagonism.  A significant reduction of ethnic 
disparities and ethnic peace might be realized, but not through a 
U.S./India model, a “cure” that is likely to kill the patient. 
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